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MORE RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVES* 
MICHAEL COENEN** 
Courts often fault governments for pursuing their regulatory 
interests in an unnecessarily restrictive manner. Indeed, and as is 
well appreciated by courts, litigants, and scholars alike, the 
availability of a “less restrictive alternative” will often spell the 
doom of a constitutionally suspect law. Sometimes, however, this 
logic gets flipped on its head, with courts faulting governments 
for failing to utilize alternatives that are more restrictive rather 
than less. This Article collects examples of what it calls “more 
restrictive means” analysis in U.S. constitutional law and 
attempts to make sense of its analytical underpinnings. 
Specifically, the Article suggests that courts invoke “more 
restrictive alternatives” for at least one of two purposes: (a) to 
undercut the government’s claim that a regulatory interest 
requires it to discriminate in a constitutionally problematic 
manner (highlighting what is described as an “equality-based” 
defect in the law under review); and/or (b) to cast doubt on the 
government’s commitment to a claimed regulatory interest 
(highlighting what is described as a “sincerity-based” defect in 
the law under review). The Article also analyzes the various types 
of defenses the government might raise on behalf of its decision 
to regulate less restrictively, such as the claim that a more 
restrictive alternative would fail to produce additional regulatory 
benefits, the claim that it would increase administrative costs, and 
the claim that it would undermine important “lenience-related” 
interests that the less restrictive law is better capable of 
promoting. Additionally, the Article considers the relationship 
between the constitutional import of a more restrictive alternative 
and the constitutional validity of the alternative itself, suggesting 
somewhat counterintuitively that more restrictive alternatives of 
questionable constitutionality can sometimes support 
invalidation of the laws with which they are compared. The 
upshot of this analysis is a novel and systematic framework for 
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thinking about more restrictive alternatives and their place within 
U.S. constitutional law. 
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In constitutional law, it is not always true that the ends justify the 
means. Although a law’s validity will often depend on the strength of 
the government interests said to justify it, courts must also attend to 
the question of how the law pursues the interests it purports to 
achieve. Constitutional difficulties do not disappear just because a law 
happens to connect with a governmental interest that is “legitimate,” 
“important,” or even “compelling”; to withstand attack, the law must 
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also advance that interest in an appropriate manner. Justifying a law’s 
ends amounts to only half of the battle; even where the ends pass 
muster, so too must the means.1 
How do courts evaluate the means by which a government 
pursues a given regulatory interest? One familiar technique, utilized 
across a variety of substantive domains, involves so-called “less 
restrictive means” analysis.2 The underlying insight is straightforward: 
if a challenged law advances a government interest while imposing 
constitutional costs on regulated parties, and if an alternative law 
could achieve that same interest without imposing those costs, then 
the challenged law must go. The existence of a “less restrictive 
alternative,” in other words, undercuts the case for upholding the 
“more restrictive” approach under review. Even if the relevant 
government interest might sometimes justify a sacrifice in the way of 
liberty interests, equality interests, structural safeguards, or some 
other constitutionally salient value, courts should not countenance 
such a sacrifice when a less restrictive alternative stands waiting in the 
wings. 
To take a simple example, imagine a First Amendment challenge 
to a city ordinance that prohibits the holding of outdoor political 
rallies within municipal boundaries. Imagine also that city officials 
defend the law by reference to a government interest in avoiding 
noise and disorder on city streets. Because the ban is a “content-
based” regulation of speech (insofar as it takes aim at only political 
rallies), a court is likely to subject this law to strict scrutiny.3 Applying 
strict scrutiny, the court is likely to identify several less restrictive 
laws that might still allow the city to achieve its peace-promoting 
goals. The city might, for instance, prohibit the holding of political 
 
 1. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 464–65 (1980) (“For even the most legitimate goal 
may not be advanced in a constitutionally impermissible manner.”). 
 2. For descriptions of the logic underlying “less restrictive means” analysis, see, for 
example, Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1326 
(2007); David B. Kopel, The First Amendment Guide to the Second Amendment, 81 TENN. 
L. REV. 417, 465–66 (2014); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and 
Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2422 (1996) [hereinafter Volokh, 
Freedom of Speech]; Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right To Keep and Bear Arms for 
Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1443, 1465 (2009) [hereinafter 
Volokh, Right To Keep and Bear Arms]. Less restrictive means analysis enjoys a strong 
foothold in other jurisdictions as well, where courts have incorporated it as a discrete 
component of “proportionality”-based rights review. See, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum, 
Limiting Constitutional Rights, 54 UCLA L. REV. 789, 836–37 (2007); Vicki C. Jackson, 
Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094, 3099 (2015); Jud 
Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion? American Rights Review and the 
Problem of Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797, 802–03 (2011). 
 3. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988). 
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rallies in residential neighborhoods, prohibit political rallies during 
weeknights, prohibit political rallies with 100 or more participants, 
prohibit only those rallies that are “disorderly,” and so forth. At least 
some of these alternatives would achieve tolerable levels of peace and 
tranquility for city residents, and all would do so in a manner that 
lessens the burden on would-be rally-goers’ free-speech rights. Given 
the existence of these less restrictive means, a court would have good 
reason to conclude that the city has pursued its interests in an 
impermissible way. 
Now consider an alternative possibility. Suppose that the city 
demonstrates that none of the less restrictive alternatives identified 
would achieve a comparable level of peace and quiet on its streets. 
Should the city then prevail? Not necessarily. Even with the less 
restrictive alternatives disqualified, there remain other sorts of 
alternatives that might still compel the law’s invalidation. Specifically, 
rather than curtail the restriction imposed by the existing law, the city 
might instead expand the restriction, so as to bring even more 
expressive conduct within its regulatory reach. One possibility would 
entail a ban on political rallies in addition to some other types of 
rallies, such as religious rallies and sports-related rallies. Another 
possibility would entail a ban on political rallies that occur both 
indoors and outdoors. An even broader possibility might involve a 
categorical ban on all types of rallies—be they centered on politics, 
religion, motorcycles, sports, or any other subject about which large 
groups of people come together in support of some cause. Yet 
another possibility might be a wholesale ban on assembling in public 
areas, regardless of whether the assembling is intended to serve 
expressive or non-expressive purposes. Would-be political rally-ers, to 
be sure, would fare no better under any of these alternative laws; 
rather, the only change would be a worsening of the situation faced by 
other individuals who are currently unburdened by the status quo 
regime. And yet, at least some of these more restrictive alternatives 
might provide a valid reason for invalidating the less restrictive law 
under review. 
Scholars and practitioners of constitutional law are by no means 
unfamiliar with the proposition that expanding a law’s regulatory 
burdens (or contracting a law’s regulatory benefits) can sometimes 
ameliorate its constitutional defects. Most familiarly, it has long been 
recognized that governments may remediate equal protection 
problems by “leveling down” a law’s treatment of a currently 
advantaged group to align with its treatment of a currently 
disadvantaged group. If, after all, discrimination is the relevant 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2017) 
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concern, then a law that treats everyone poorly might prove less 
constitutionally problematic than a law that treats some people well.4 
This rule has carried force outside the equal protection context as 
well. Other doctrines enshrine nondiscrimination principles of their 
own, and these principles often support claims that a more restrictive 
law poses fewer constitutional problems than its less restrictive 
counterpart. Thus, for instance, we might find a dormant Commerce 
Clause violation in a law that taxes resident income at ten percent and 
nonresident income at fifteen percent, whereas we would not find 
such a violation in a law that taxes both resident and nonresident 
income at fifteen percent.5 We might find a Free Exercise Clause 
violation in a law that prohibits only worshipers from ingesting 
peyote, whereas we would not find such a violation in a state that 
prohibits both worshipers and non-worshipers from ingesting peyote.6 
And we might find a First Amendment violation in a content-based 
law that singles out certain types of speech for adverse treatment but 
not in a content-neutral law that subjects all forms of that speech to 
the same adverse treatment.7 What is true in the equal protection 
context thus turns out to be true in other constitutional contexts as 
well. “More restrictive” does not always equate to “more 
unconstitutional”: sometimes governments can eliminate 
 
 4. See, e.g., Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1806 
(2015) (noting that it “is simply a truism about every case under the dormant Commerce 
Clause (not to mention the Equal Protection Clause)” that “[w]henever government 
impermissibly treats like cases differently, it can cure the violation by .	.	. ‘leveling 
down’”); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 272 (1979) (“In every equal protection attack upon a 
statute challenged as underinclusive, the State may satisfy the Constitution’s commands 
either by extending	benefits	to the previously disfavored class or by denying benefits to 
both parties (e.g.,	by repealing the statute as a whole).”); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 
217, 218–19 (1971) (holding that Jackson, Mississippi did not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause when it decided to shut down its racially segregated public swimming pools rather 
than open those pools to everyone). For scholarly treatments of the subject, see, for 
example, Deborah L. Brake, When Equality Leaves Everyone Worse Off: The Problem of 
Leveling Down in Equality Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 515 (2004); Evan H. 
Caminker, Note, A Norm-Based Remedial Model for Underinclusive Statutes, 95 YALE L.J. 
1185, 1185 (1986); Jean Marie Doherty, Note, Law in an Elevator: When Leveling Down 
Remedies Let Equality Off in the Basement, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1017, 1020 (2008). 
 5. Cf., e.g., Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1822 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that, on the 
logic of the majority opinion, “Maryland could eliminate the [constitutional violation] by 
terminating the special nonresident tax—a measure that would not help the Wynnes at 
all”). 
 6. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990). 
 7. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 205 (1983) (noting that the First Amendment’s content 
discrimination principle “may invite government to ‘equalize,’ not by permitting more 
speech, but by adopting even more ‘suppressive’ content-neutral restrictions”). 
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constitutional problems simply by increasing, rather than decreasing, 
the scope of a law’s regulatory burdens.8 
But the question posed by the “no political rallies” hypothetical 
is not simply whether the government could cure a constitutionally 
defective (and less restrictive) law by adopting a more restrictive 
alternative in its stead. Rather, the relevant question is whether, and 
if so when, the availability of such an alternative should count as a 
reason for invalidating the less restrictive law under review. Indeed, 
the remedial question of whether the government may ratchet up 
restrictiveness in response to an adverse merits-based ruling is distinct 
from the substantive question of whether a hypothetically available 
more restrictive alternative should produce such an adverse ruling in 
the first place.9 It is one thing to highlight a more restrictive 
alternative as a permissible substitute for a law whose 
 
 8. This point relates to Professor Matthew Adler’s important observation that U.S. 
constitutional rights tend to operate as “rule-centered” rather than “act-shielding” 
restrictions on government action. See Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral 
Structure of American Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1–173 (1998). As Adler 
points out, “[t]o say that sanctioning X pursuant to a particular rule violates her 
constitutional rights does not entail that the particular action at stake .	.	. is 
constitutionally protected from being sanctioned pursuant to all other rules.” Id. at 14. 
Rather, the statement signifies only that “a reviewing court should at X’s instance 
invalidate, in some measure, a particular rule.” Id. It is for this reason, for instance, that 
the government can permissibly prosecute an act of flag burning pursuant to a statute that 
criminalizes arson but not pursuant to a statute that criminalizes flag burning as such. Id. 
at 4–5. If U.S. constitutional law were truly “act-shielding” in its focus, then governments 
could never remediate unconstitutional action by increasing the scope of a law’s burdens 
(and thus leaving the constitutionally protected act just as unshielded as was previously 
the case). But as the foregoing examples demonstrate, the doctrine often permits 
governments to do just that. The doctrine’s willingness to permit remediation via 
restrictiveness-related increases (in addition to restrictiveness-related decreases) thus 
provides strong support for Professor Adler’s descriptive claim about the rule dependent 
nature of constitutional rights. 
  The point also resonates with Professor John Fee’s recent exploration of “greater-
or-nothing” rules in constitutional law—rules that, as Professor Fee explains, stem from 
the proposition that “[t]he power to do A plus B does not necessarily include the power to 
do A alone.” See John Fee, Greater-or-Nothing Constitutional Rules, 64 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 101, 102 (2013). As Professor Fee himself notes, some—though by no means all—
such rules stem from the same sorts of doctrinal structures in which more restrictive means 
analysis is most likely to be employed. See id. at 109–13. As I explain further below, my 
focus here is not on the entire universe of doctrinal rules that permit the government to do 
“A plus B” but not “A alone.” Rather, it is on the narrower range of circumstances in 
which the government’s failure to do “A plus B” provides a reason to reject its justification 
for doing “A alone.” In this sense, I believe that the analysis I provide here usefully 
complements Professor Fee’s important and wide-ranging analysis of “greater or lesser” 
problems throughout constitutional law, by providing a more focused and in-depth 
treatment of one of several ways in which constitutional law might come to allow the 
imposition of a “greater” while keeping the “lesser” off limits. 
 9. See infra Part V.  
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unconstitutionality has already been shown, but it is another thing to 
leverage such an alternative for the purpose of demonstrating that a 
constitutional violation has in fact occurred. If the interests 
underlying a law could be equally or better served by worsening the 
lot of some regulated parties while improving the lot of no regulated 
parties, when (and how) should that fact count as a strike against the 
law that the government has chosen to adopt? That, in a nutshell, is 
the question that this Article confronts. 
The question is worth confronting because more restrictive 
means analysis does in fact occur within U.S. constitutional law, as 
both the Supreme Court and lower courts have shown receptiveness 
to the (sometimes) counterintuitive proposition that the government 
can violate the Constitution because it has not regulated restrictively 
enough.10 But in so doing, these courts have yet to develop a 
systematic framework for understanding (a) the mechanisms by which 
a more restrictive alternative might cast doubt on the validity of a less 
restrictive law, and (b) the justifications the government might offer 
on behalf of its decision not to regulate more restrictively. These 
analytical shortcomings in the case law, in turn, have generated spotty 
and inconsistent outcomes across cases, whose precedential 
implications thus remain vexing and unclear.11 A sustained treatment 
of more restrictive means analysis in U.S. constitutional law thus 
might help us to make better sense of the existing case law, while also 
yielding prescriptive insights for the application of more restrictive 
means analysis in future cases. 
The descriptive components of this task are carried out in the 
first two Parts of the paper. Part I offers definitional details, relating 
the notion of constitutional “restrictiveness” to other concepts and 
ideas that more often find expression in constitutional doctrine. Part 
II goes on to survey existing approaches to more restrictive means 
analysis within different areas of the law, demonstrating both (a) the 
 
 10. See infra Part II.  
 11. To be sure, several scholars have addressed aspects of more restrictive means 
analysis, although typically in the context of specific areas of substantive doctrine. See, e.g., 
Clay Calvert, Underinclusivity and the First Amendment: The Legislative Right to Nibble at 
Problems After Williams-Yulee, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 525, 528 (2016); Richard F. Duncan, Free 
Exercise is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi, and the General Applicability 
Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850, 868 (2001) (considering the problem within the 
free-exercise context); William E. Lee, The First Amendment Doctrine of Underbreadth, 
71 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 637 (1993) (considering various applications of “more restrictive 
means” analysis within the free-speech context); Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, 
The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 347–48 (1949) (considering 
aspects of the problem within the equal protection context). This Article, by contrast, 
represents an attempt to develop a broader, trans-substantive account of the phenomenon. 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2017) 
8 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96 
wide variety of contexts in which the Court has engaged in more 
restrictive means analysis of some form and (b) the absence of a 
coherent approach to the question of when more restrictive 
alternatives should in fact carry doctrinal weight. 
That sets the stage for the analytical part of the inquiry. Part III 
begins by disaggregating and describing two different mechanisms by 
which a more restrictive alternative can highlight constitutional 
defects in a less restrictive law.12 First, the more restrictive alternative 
might help to highlight equality-related defects in the law under 
review. Where a law employs a form of discriminatory treatment that 
the doctrine disfavors, a court has reason to invalidate the law if it can 
determine that the discriminatory treatment is not necessary to the 
achievement of the government’s ends, and a more restrictive 
alternative can often help to demonstrate that this is the case. The 
hypothetical “no political rallies” law, for instance, draws a content-
based distinction between political and non-political rallies. But there 
exist several more restrictive alternatives to that law that could just as 
effectively further the relevant government interests (i.e., peace and 
tranquility for city residents) without discriminating between rallies 
on the basis of their subject matter (e.g., “no rallies, period”; “no 
gathering on the streets”). And because the First Amendment 
disfavors content discrimination as such, a court might well conclude 
that the city went about pursuing its interests in a manner that is 
unnecessarily discriminatory and therefore constitutionally 
impermissible. More restrictive alternatives, in other words, can often 
function as nondiscriminatory alternatives, undercutting the 
government’s claim that a particular regulatory interest requires it to 
discriminate in a constitutionally problematic fashion. 
 
 12. Other commentators have alluded to this basic distinction, especially as it arises in 
the free-speech context. See, e.g., Volokh, Freedom of Speech, supra note 2, at 2423 
(noting, in the free speech context, that a law’s underinclusiveness may demonstrate “that 
the interest isn’t very important, or that the government’s real interest wasn’t the stated 
one but was rather just a desire to favor one form of speech over another, or to suppress 
offensive or otherwise disfavored speech,” and that underinclusiveness may also 
demonstrate that “the presence of content discrimination beyond that justified by the 
compelling interest”); see also City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 51–52 (1994) (quoting 
First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785 (1978)) (noting that 
underinclusiveness might reveal the existence of an impermissible “attempt to give one 
side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people,” or 
instead might “diminish the credibility of the government’s rationale for restricting speech 
in the first place”); ARTHUR D. HELLMAN, WILLIAM D. ARAIZA & THOMAS E. BAKER, 
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION & FREEDOM OF RELIGION 407–08 
(2nd ed. 2011) (describing the two different accounts of underinclusiveness offered by the 
Court in City of Ladue). 
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But more restrictive alternatives do not operate solely in 
connection with an established legal presumption against 
discriminatory treatment: claimants might also invoke a more 
restrictive means to support a sincerity-based attack on a 
constitutionally suspect law. More specifically, where a challenged 
law furthers a claimed government interest with only some 
effectiveness, and where a more restrictive law would serve that 
government interest with greater effectiveness, the government’s 
failure to regulate more restrictively may support an inference that 
the regulatory object of a law is something other than the interest that 
the government has identified. Our hypothetical “no political rallies” 
law might suffer from this constitutional defect as well. If it turned out 
that sports-related rallies caused more chaos and disruption within 
the city than did political rallies, the city’s failure to include sports-
related rallies within the scope of its anti-rallying ordinance would 
complicate its efforts to justify the law as a peace- and tranquility-
promoting measure. That the city has chosen to regulate less 
restrictively might indicate that it is actually seeking to suppress 
undesirable political speech, pursuing an aim that the First 
Amendment flatly condemns. The more restrictive alternative thus 
helps to reveal that the government has done less than what a true 
commitment to a legitimate interest would require, and that 
revelation, in turn, provides a ground for supposing that some other, 
illegitimate interest actually underlies the less restrictive law under 
review. 
The equality- and sincerity-based rationales for more restrictive 
means analysis thus help to answer the question of why courts should 
sometimes treat a law’s relative lenience as a constitutional liability. 
But with that question answered, a second analytical challenge arises: 
if more restrictive alternatives should sometimes carry force, then we 
must next explain why they sometimes should not. At first glance, the 
underlying logic of both the equality- and sincerity-related arguments 
might seem to enjoy a nearly limitless range of successful application, 
pushing toward the bizarre conclusion that the only constitutionally 
acceptable regime is one in which no one is ever allowed to do 
anything anywhere. Common sense and everyday practice indicate 
that this is clearly not the case, but some additional analytical work is 
needed to explain why that is so. Thus, the remainder of the Article, 
set forth in Parts IV and V, attempts to identify, taxonomize, and 
evaluate the various types of arguments that government actors might 
offer in response to the claim that they have regulated with 
insufficient restrictiveness. These Parts thus lay out the sorts of 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2017) 
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considerations that function to cabin the scope of the equality- and 
sincerity-based arguments, and they also highlight the various ways in 
which government actors might appeal to these considerations in 
rebutting a claim of insufficient restrictiveness. 
The first set of considerations, canvassed in Part IV, concerns 
issues of regulatory viability. Both the equality- and sincerity-based 
applications of more restrictive means analysis require some 
investigation of the extent to which a more restrictive alternative 
would serve the government interests invoked on behalf of a 
challenged law. That investigation, in turn, creates an opening for the 
government to argue that the posited alternative is not in fact an 
adequate regulatory substitute. The government might pursue this 
claim in four different ways, arguing that a more restrictive 
alternative would (1) yield little in the way of additional regulatory 
benefits, (2) prove too costly to administer, (3) actively undermine 
the regulatory interests that a challenged law directly pursues, and/or 
(4) undermine other government interests associated with the lenient 
aspects of the status quo regime. Some of these claims are more 
persuasive than others, and their persuasiveness will often depend on 
whether the claimant is advancing an equality- or sincerity-based 
attack. But by separating out these claims and evaluating each on its 
own terms, we can help to lay the groundwork for a more coherent 
and principled judicial assessment of the comparative regulatory 
merits of more restrictive alternatives and their less restrictive 
counterparts. 
A second set of considerations, canvassed in Part V, centers on 
the issue of constitutional viability. Simply put, the government might 
sometimes defend its failure to adopt a more restrictive alternative by 
contending that the alternative itself would create constitutional 
problems. Perhaps, for instance, an expanded prohibition on all 
rallying would itself violate the First Amendment, in which case the 
government could point to the likely unconstitutionality of the more 
restrictive alternative as helping to justify its enactment of a less 
restrictive law. This sort of “constitutional viability” defense gives rise 
to a question that is both theoretically interesting and practically 
important: to what extent must a posited more restrictive alternative 
itself avoid constitutional difficulties in order to carry doctrinal 
weight? That question may seem easy to answer. Obviously, one 
might say, a more restrictive means must itself qualify as 
unambiguously valid in order to support a constitutional attack on a 
less restrictive law. But in fact, the answer is not as straightforward as 
it may appear. The general, if somewhat counterintuitive, conclusion 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2017) 
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is that, while an unconstitutional more restrictive alternative can 
never support an equality-based attack on a less restrictive law, it can 
sometimes support a sincerity-based attack on the same. 
Before we proceed further, two methodological clarifications are 
in order. First, as this Introduction reveals, the ensuing analysis treats 
more restrictive means analysis as a trans-substantive problem of 
constitutional law, according only limited significance to the 
traditional boundaries that divide up constitutional doctrine. Some 
limits, however, necessarily constrain the Article’s scope. Most 
importantly, the Article considers only those areas of doctrine that 
require a judicial assessment of the fit between a challenged law and 
the government interests it is said to serve; where no such 
“means/ends” assessment is required, more restrictive alternatives 
will prove irrelevant to the cases being decided. What is more, the 
Article focuses primarily on doctrines that call for heightened 
means/ends scrutiny of constitutionally suspect laws, taking it largely 
for granted that the presence or absence of more restrictive 
alternatives will not often influence the court’s application of rational 
basis review.13 Put another way, the domain of the Article includes all 
areas of doctrine where courts (a) must assess the means by which a 
challenged law furthers a stated government interest, and (b) must do 
so according to a level of scrutiny that is at least somewhat more 
exacting than standard-form rational basis analysis.14 
Second, with respect to the evaluative and prescriptive 
components of the inquiry, the Article attempts to steer a middle 
course between the twin extremes of rigid doctrinal fidelity and 
freewheeling doctrinal reform. This analysis does not go so far as to 
take all features of the doctrine as established and unchangeable (in 
which case evaluation and prescription would be impossible), but it 
also does not treat every feature of the doctrine as flexible and up for 
grabs (in which case evaluation and prescription would be of little 
 
 13. This point finds support in the Court’s oft-quoted suggestion that—as far as 
rational basis analysis is concerned—the government is free to confront a regulatory 
problem “one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems 
most acute to the legislative mind.” Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 
(1955). So long as that proposition remains true, claimants will have difficulty convincing 
courts that a law that confronts one “phase” of a problem but not another should be 
invalidated in light of more restrictive alternatives that would confront more phases of the 
problem at the same time. 
 14. I do discuss a few cases that, while purporting to apply standard rational basis 
review, in fact depart substantially from its traditionally deferential mood. See,	e.g., infra 
Section II.C (discussing the Court’s implementation of “rational basis with bite” review in 
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985)). 
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practical use). Here, in particular, the study focuses on the particular 
phenomenon of more restrictive means analysis, while leaving largely 
unquestioned the broader constitutional frameworks within which 
that analysis operates. Thus, for instance, the Article does not 
consider whether means/ends analysis should itself play a significant 
role in guiding the application of many different constitutional 
guarantees, whether different types of governmental regulation 
should trigger meaningfully different levels of means/ends scrutiny 
(e.g., strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, rational basis), whether 
facially discriminatory laws should face tougher constitutionally 
scrutiny than do facially neutral laws with discriminatory effects, and 
so forth. In taking these propositions as a given, I do not mean to 
suggest that they are immune from criticism. Rather, my concern in 
this Article is the narrower question of what those propositions imply 
when it comes to asking whether the government has regulated with 
insufficient restrictiveness. To be sure, these insights may yield some 
troubling or untoward results, which may require a rethinking of the 
overall wisdom of more restrictive means analysis and the premises 
that give it force. But before that rethinking occurs, we need first to 
understand where the analysis comes from and how it relates to 
broader features of the doctrine writ large. That is what this Article 
attempts to do. 
I. DEFINING “MORE RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVES” 
A. Restrictiveness Defined 
Under what circumstances does one law qualify as “more 
restrictive” than another?15 For purposes of this Article, the following 
definition will apply: 
 
 15. I am aware of only a few instances in which the Court or one of its members has 
used the phrase “more restrictive” in the manner I describe. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 404 n.5 (1992) (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (attributing to 
the majority opinion the conclusion that a more restrictive alternative could adequately 
serve the compelling need identified by St. Paul lawmakers); Zauderer v. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 649 (1985) (“We are not persuaded that identifying 
deceptive or manipulative uses of visual media in advertising is so intrinsically 
burdensome that the State is entitled to forgo that task in favor of the more convenient 
but far	more	restrictive	alternative	of a blanket ban on the use of illustrations.”); Clements 
v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 989 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“A provision directed only 
at Texas officeholders, that gave those officeholders a choice between resigning and 
serving out their current terms would serve all of the asserted state interests; yet Texas has 
inexplicably chosen this far more restrictive alternative.”); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 
475 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“Under the Court’s approach today, the State 
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Law A+ is “more restrictive” than Law A when it is true that 
either: (a) at least one individual party regulated by Law A+ is 
subject to a regulatory burden that is more severe than what that 
party experienced under Law A, and no regulated party is subject 
to a regulatory burden that is less severe than what that party 
experienced under Law A, or (b) at least one individual party 
regulated by Law A+ receives a regulatory benefit that is less 
generous than what that party experienced under Law A, and no 
regulated party receives a regulatory benefit that is more 
generous than what that party experienced under Law A. 
More generally, if government actors modify a law so as to 
improve its treatment of nonregulated parties and to worsen its 
treatment of at least one regulated party, then the modified law 
qualifies as a more restrictive alternative to the unmodified law.16 
A few features of this definition warrant emphasis. First and 
foremost, the definition proceeds in relative terms, meaning that a 
given law’s status as a more restrictive alternative exists in relation to 
an established legal baseline. A law might qualify as a more restrictive 
alternative in comparison to one law but not in comparison to 
another—its status as such depends on the particular legal reference 
point against which it is being evaluated. The definition, in other 
words, does not attempt to posit some threshold level of 
restrictiveness that differentiates restrictive and nonrestrictive laws. 
Rather, it attempts only to furnish some means of determining 
whether one law counts as more or less restrictive in relation to 
another. 
Second, in gauging relative levels of restrictiveness, the definition 
focuses on formal legal treatment of regulated parties. This condition 
thus deliberately omits the experiences of nonregulated parties, who 
sometimes may find themselves significantly less restricted on account 
of a formally more restrictive means.17 Consider, for instance, 
 
would fare better by adopting more restrictive means, a judicial incentive I had thought 
this Court would hesitate to afford.”). 
 16. In this sense, a more restrictive alternative might be characterized as “Pareto 
inferior” to its less restrictive counterpart—at least where the relevant Pareto principle is 
“strong” rather than “weak” and the only costs and benefits being considered are the costs 
and benefits formally allocated by the law. See generally MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-
BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 53 (2012) 
(distinguishing between the “strong” Pareto principle, which deems x as superior to y if no 
one is worse off under x and at least some are better off under y, and the “weak” Pareto 
principle, which deems x as superior to y if everyone is better off under x and no one is 
worse off under x). 
 17. I should further emphasize that in distinguishing between regulated and 
nonregulated parties I do not mean to suggest as a normative matter that the interests of 
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legislative action that expands the reach of an antipollution statute. 
Under the definition adopted here, the expanded antipollution statute 
would qualify as more restrictive than the previous antipollution 
statute if it improved the lot of zero would-be polluters and worsened 
the lot of at least some would-be polluters. And that would remain so 
even if the law produced a significantly less restrictive environment 
for everyone else via improvements to public health and outdoor 
enjoyment. All laws produce winners and losers, and some increases 
in formal restrictiveness will nonetheless generate welfare- and 
liberty-promoting results for regulatory beneficiaries. But the 
definition offered here does not attempt to account for all of these 
consequences. Rather, it assumes the perspective of each party 
regulated by a law and asks, from that perspective, whether the law’s 
formal treatment of the individual has become more burdensome (or 
less beneficial) than had previously been the case. 
Third, and relatedly, the definition ignores the system-wide 
effects of the two laws subject to comparison.18 Restrictiveness is 
gauged from an atomized and individualistic perspective, with the 
benefits and burdens imposed on one party viewed in isolation from 
the benefits and burdens imposed on other parties. Suppose, for 
instance, that Law A taxes in-state citizens at five percent and out-of-
state citizens at ten percent, and suppose further that Law A+ taxes 
both in-state and out-of-state citizens at ten percent.19 Out-of-state 
citizens may plausibly claim that they fare better under Law A+ than 
under Law A, for the simple reason that Law A, while leaving their 
tax rates unchanged, at least “eliminates the unfairness of being 
treated differently.”20 Valid as that consideration may be, however, it 
has no bearing on the relative restrictiveness of Law A, because 
“restrictiveness,” as we have defined it, excludes cross-party 
comparisons in regulatory treatment. In other words, for the limited 
purpose of asking whether Law A+ counts as more or less restrictive 
than Law A, we should ignore any positive effects that arise on 
 
the former should in fact be greater cause for concern than the interests of the latter. Cf. 
Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 
91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 186–88 (1992) (suggesting that the distinction between “regulated 
objects” and “regulatory beneficiaries” “load[s] the dice” by falsely presupposing a 
natural, baseline state of affairs in which the endowments and entitlements of “regulated 
objects” exist entirely independent of the common law regime). 
 18. See Adrian Vermeule, Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV. 
L. REV. 4, 6 (2009). 
 19. See Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1823 (2015) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting) (providing an analogous illustration where “leveling up” or “leveling down” 
alleviates a discriminatory tax). 
 20. Id. 
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account of any one party’s awareness of how the law treats similarly 
situated parties. This is not to say that such effects are unimportant. 
To the contrary, these effects go a long way towards explaining why 
more restrictive alternatives sometimes prove constitutionally 
preferable to their less restrictive counterparts. But for purposes of 
analytical clarity, “cross-party dynamics” of this sort are best left out 
of the threshold determination of whether one law qualifies as “more 
restrictive” than another. 
None of these three conditions is intended to signal any 
normative or constitutional assumptions about the desirability of 
increasing (or decreasing) a law’s restrictiveness. The conditions 
instead reflect a set of definitional choices, intended to establish a 
useful analytical framework for understanding a set of complex 
problems that courts routinely confront. I emphasize that I am 
claiming no essential truths here; to the extent that one would prefer 
to understand restrictiveness differently, alternative conceptual 
frameworks could certainly be developed. The important point is 
simply that the concept of a “more restrictive alternative” by no 
means equates with the concept of a “less constitutional alternative” 
(nor does it equate to the concept of a “less desirable alternative”). 
When and how those concepts should equate is an interesting 
question that will be taken up in due course.21 For the time being, 
however, it suffices to say that by identifying Law A+ as more 
restrictive than Law A, one need not embrace any evaluative 
conclusions about how those two laws should be dealt with by the 
courts. 
B. Related Concepts 
1. Nondiscriminatory Alternatives 
A “nondiscriminatory alternative,” as its name suggests, pursues 
an identified government interest in a manner that avoids a 
constitutionally suspect form of discriminatory treatment.22 This 
concept arises with frequency in U.S. constitutional law.23 In the equal 
protection context, for instance, courts sometimes ask whether there 
exists a “race-neutral” means of achieving the government interests 
 
 21. See infra Part V. 
 22. See Fee, supra note 8, at 109. 
 23. See id. at 109–13 (noting the emergence of “antidiscrimination rules” within 
several different areas of constitutional law). 
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underlying a non-race-neutral law,24 or whether there exists a 
“gender-neutral” alternative to a “gender-based” law.25 In the free 
speech context, courts often inquire into whether there exists a 
“content-neutral” means of achieving the government interests 
underlying a “content-based law.”26 And in the dormant Commerce 
Clause context, courts sometimes ask whether there exists a 
nondiscriminatory means of achieving the government’s interests 
underlying a law that facially discriminates against interstate 
commerce.27 A “nondiscriminatory alternative,” in short, is any 
proposed alternative to a challenged law that steers clear of the 
constitutionally problematic form of discriminatory treatment that the 
challenged law employs. 
How do nondiscriminatory alternatives relate to more restrictive 
alternatives? In many cases, a more restrictive alternative will turn 
out also to be a nondiscriminatory alternative, and vice versa.28 But 
the categories are not in fact co-extensive. Nondiscriminatory 
alternatives can just as easily qualify as less restrictive (compare, for 
instance, a hypothetical twenty percent/ten percent tax to an across-
the-board tax at ten percent), or as neither more nor less restrictive in 
an absolute sense (compare, again, the twenty percent/ten percent tax 
to an across-the-board tax at fifteen percent). This is another way of 
saying that governments can alleviate inequalities in different ways. 
They can “level down” a law’s treatment of previously advantaged 
parties to match its treatment of previously disadvantaged parties; 
they can “level up” a law’s treatment of previously disadvantaged 
parties to match its treatment of previously advantaged parties; or 
they can “level to the middle,” by partially ameliorating a law’s 
treatment of the previously disadvantaged parties and partially 
 
 24. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003) (“Narrow tailoring .	.	. 
require[s] serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives .	.	.	.”). 
 25. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (“Where, as here, the State’s .	.	. 
purposes are as well served by a gender-neutral classification as one that gender classifies 
and therefore carries with it the baggage of sexual stereotypes, the State cannot be 
permitted to classify on the basis of sex.”). 
 26. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992) (noting that 
“existence of adequate content-neutral alternatives thus ‘undercut[s] significantly’ any 
defense of .	.	. a [content-based] statute”) (citing Boos v. Berry, 485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988)). 
 27. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (noting that “facial 
discrimination invokes the strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose and 
of the absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives”). 
 28. Compare, for instance, a rule that taxes A at twenty percent and B at ten percent 
with an alternative rule that taxes both A and B at twenty percent; the latter qualifies as 
both nondiscriminatory as between A and B and more restrictive than the original rule. 
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worsening its treatment of previously advantaged parties.29 All three 
modifications are capable of producing nondiscriminatory 
alternatives, but only one of them is capable of producing a more 
restrictive alternative as well. 
Thus, not all nondiscriminatory alternatives qualify as more 
restrictive alternatives. Nor, for that matter, do all more restrictive 
alternatives qualify as nondiscriminatory alternatives. For example, 
rather than tax A at ten percent and B at twenty percent, a 
government might instead tax A at ten percent and B at thirty 
percent. In no sense does the modified law alleviate discriminatory 
treatment of A and B (if anything, it exacerbates it), but the new law 
would still qualify as more restrictive than the law that it replaced. 
Further, some more restrictive alternatives might exist in relation to 
laws that are not even discriminatory in the first place. A law that 
prohibits everyone from purchasing guns, for instance, might not give 
rise to a discrimination-based constitutional claim. But we can still 
imagine alternatives to such a law that would qualify as 
unambiguously more restrictive than the status quo regime.30 The 
category of more restrictive alternatives, in short, is neither 
coextensive with, nor subsumed by, the category of nondiscriminatory 
alternatives. A law can be more restrictive without being 
nondiscriminatory, just as it can be nondiscriminatory without being 
more restrictive. 
2. Underinclusiveness 
More restrictive means analysis also relates closely to the 
concept of “underinclusiveness.” Generally speaking, courts and 
commentators use the term “underinclusive” to describe a law that 
applies less broadly than they would either expect or prefer to be the 
case.31 Not surprisingly, more restrictive means analysis will often 
 
 29. See Brake, supra note 4, at 515 (questioning the “presumptive permissibility of 
leveling down” as a means of remediating violations of equality-based norms). 
 30. Consider, for example, a law that prevents everyone from purchasing guns and 
knives. 
 31. Tussman and tenBroek, for instance, define “underinclusiveness” by reference to 
the relationship between the “Trait” (“T”) underlying a legal classification and the 
“Mischief” (“M”) that the law attempts to mitigate. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 
11, at 347. As they explain, an underinclusive statute is one for which “[a]ll T’s are M’s but 
some M’s are not T’s”—or, less abstractly, for which “[a]ll who are included in the class 
[defined by the Trait] are tainted with the mischief, but there are others also tainted whom 
the classification does not include.” Id. at 347–48. The term can also mean other things in 
other contexts. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, The Changing Faces of First Amendment Neutrality: 
R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Rust v. Sullivan, and the Problem of Content-Based Underinclusion, 
1992 SUP. CT. REV. 29, 38 (1992) (suggesting that “content-based underinclusion” inheres 
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implicate this general idea. Suppose, for instance, that a state 
attempts to reduce the incidence of drunk driving by restricting 
alcohol purchases by males under the age of twenty-one and by 
females under the age of eighteen.32 Suppose further that the state 
could more effectively achieve this interest by extending the ban to 
include females between the age of eighteen and twenty, thus 
expanding the pool of individuals subject to the restriction. Under 
these circumstances, the more restrictive alternative of a stricter, 
gender-neutral prohibition on purchasing alcohol would help to 
demonstrate the underinclusiveness of the less restrictive law under 
review. In other words, the law’s underinclusiveness is a condition 
made manifest by the availability of a more restrictive alternative. 
The gender-based alcohol-purchasing requirement is underinclusive 
by virtue of the fact that a more restrictive (and gender-neutral) 
prohibition would achieve the state’s interests more effectively than 
the less restrictive (and gender-based) prohibition being challenged. 
Here too, however, the two concepts do not perfectly equate. For 
one thing, not every more restrictive alternative will suffice to 
demonstrate the underinclusive nature of a less restrictive law. It is 
always possible to imagine more restrictive alternatives to a 
constitutionally suspect law, but as Part III of this Article will show, 
not all such alternatives will achieve the relevant government 
interests as effectively as the “less restrictive” law under review. If, 
for instance, a forty percent tax on everyone serves the government’s 
regulatory interests just as well as a fifty percent tax on everyone, 
then the fifty percent tax—while certainly more restrictive than the 
twenty percent tax—does not showcase any real underinclusiveness 
problems in the law being reviewed. 
In addition, as it is conventionally used, the term underinclusive 
will sometimes end up pointing to the existence of an alternative that 
is less restrictive rather than more. Suppose, for instance, that a public 
scholarship program categorically withholds benefits from 1,000 
individuals whose inclusion would help to further the purposes of the 
program itself. Intuitively, the program appears to be underinclusive: 
the scope of its coverage is narrower than what its underlying 
interests would appear to demand.33 That conclusion, however, would 
 
in “government action [that] is, in the ordinary sense, narrower than the action stipulated 
to be constitutional”). 
 32. See, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 190 (1976) (providing a factually analogous 
illustration). 
 33. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 637 (1974) (holding that a provision 
of the Social Security Act designed to support the dependents of a disabled individual was 
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stem from the availability of an alternative program that treats none 
of the existing scholarship recipients any worse and at least some 
existing non-recipients much better—i.e., a less restrictive alternative, 
as the term is defined here.34 In this example, at least, the alignments 
have switched: more restrictive alternatives accompany 
overinclusiveness problems and less restrictive alternatives 
accompany underinclusiveness problems. Generalizing further, we 
might say that the connection between underinclusiveness and 
insufficient restrictiveness exists only in circumstances where 
expanding a law’s coverage results in a worsening of its overall 
treatment of regulated parties; the connection does not exist when an 
expansion of coverage redounds to the benefit of newly covered 
parties. 
 In sum, a more restrictive alternative is a law that—compared to 
some pre-existing baseline—increases regulatory burdens (or reduces 
regulatory benefits) on some regulated parties, without also reducing 
regulatory burdens (or increasing regulatory benefits) on other 
regulated parties. A more restrictive alternative will sometimes but 
not always qualify as a nondiscriminatory alternative, just as a 
nondiscriminatory alternative will sometimes, but not always, qualify 
as a more restrictive alternative. Similarly, a more restrictive 
alternative will sometimes, but not always, highlight the existence of 
underinclusiveness problems, just as underinclusiveness problems will 
sometimes, but not always, imply the existence of a more restrictive 
alternative. 
II. MORE RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVES IN U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 
How have courts utilized more restrictive means analysis in 
constitutional cases? The answer to this question is not simple. As this 
Part demonstrates, courts have employed a variety of different 
 
“‘underinclusive’ in that it conclusively excludes some illegitimate [children] .	.	. who are, 
in fact, dependent upon their disabled parent”); Henderson v. Stalder, 287 F.3d 374, 390 
(5th Cir. 2002) (“A person or group excluded from benefits conveyed via an underinclusive 
statute has standing to challenge the statute on constitutional grounds.”) (emphasis 
added); Wauchope v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 985 F.2d 1407, 1418 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that 
courts may sometimes “redress[] constitutionally underinclusive statutes by extending their 
benefits to a disfavored class” (emphasis added)). 
 34. By the same token, if the existing program extended benefits to more individuals 
than its regulatory interests demanded, we would characterize the program as 
“overinclusive”: the scope of its coverage is broader than what its underlying interests 
would appear to demand. But that conclusion would imply the availability of an 
alternative program that treats at least some of its existing recipients worse and none of its 
existing non-recipients any better—i.e., a more restrictive alternative. 
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approaches to the problem, with no obvious pattern emerging from 
the cases as a whole. In some cases, courts willingly accept the 
presence of a more restrictive alternative as a reason to invalidate a 
challenged law. In other cases, courts expressly reject—on a number 
of different grounds—the claim that a law should fail because a more 
restrictive alternative would achieve its underlying interests. And in 
other cases, still, courts avoid the issue altogether. All three 
approaches are on display in different areas of constitutional doctrine, 
as the ensuing discussion reveals. 
What follows is by no means an exhaustive survey of cases in 
which courts have confronted (or not confronted) arguments about 
more restrictive alternatives. Rather, this Part focuses on six areas of 
law in which the issue has arisen: free speech doctrine, free exercise 
doctrine, equal protection doctrine, substantive due process doctrine, 
dormant commerce doctrine, and case law involving the newly-
revitalized “equal sovereignty” principle. But these are not the only 
areas of law in which more restrictive means analysis either does or 
might come into play.35 Nor, for that matter, is my discussion of any 
given area intended to be comprehensive within its own sphere. The 
goal here, in other words, is not to offer a complete catalogue of cases 
(or even clauses) that touch on the subject of this Article. It is, rather, 
simply to showcase the variety of approaches that the Court has taken 
to more restrictive means analysis, and to suggest that the Court lacks 
a systematic framework for working through the problems to which 
the analysis gives rise. 
A. Free Speech 
At least as far back as Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,36 
the Supreme Court has drawn a critical doctrinal distinction between 
laws that regulate speech on the basis of its content and laws that 
regulate speech on the basis of some other “content-neutral” 
characteristic.37 This distinction—which underlies the so-called 
“content discrimination” principle—finds expression in the 
 
 35. Consider, for example, questions concerning the scope of Congress’s power to 
enforce the Reconstruction Amendments, which, as the Court has held, encompasses only 
“remedial measures” that are “congrue[nt] and proportional[]” in relation to the “injury to 
be prevented.” City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508, 530 (1997). As Evan Caminker 
has suggested, that test may incorporate its own sort of “means-ends” analysis, which in 
turn could provide a basis for invalidating a remedial statute on “underinclusiveness” 
grounds. See Evan H. Caminker, “Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 
Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1153–54 (2001). 
 36. 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
 37. Id. at 95. 
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differential levels of means/ends scrutiny accorded to content-based 
and content-neutral laws.38 And the content-discrimination principle 
in turn has generated several cases in which the Court has faulted the 
government for its failure to regulate more restrictively.39 
Consider R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.40 The city of St. Paul had 
criminalized certain forms of expression that “arouse[d] anger, alarm 
or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or 
gender.”41 The Minnesota Supreme Court had interpreted the law as 
a ban on “fighting words,” a historically recognized category of 
unprotected speech.42 The majority in R.A.V. did not question that 
conclusion, but it nevertheless proceeded to invalidate the law on 
First Amendment grounds.43 The problem, in short, was one of 
insufficient breadth: St. Paul had chosen to target some “fighting 
words” but not others, and it had distinguished between prohibited 
and non-prohibited fighting words on the basis of their content.44 
This, the Court held, St. Paul could not do.45 If St. Paul wished to 
pursue its government interest in “ensur[ing] the basic human rights 
of members of groups that have historically been subjected to 
discrimination,” it needed to enact a law relating to fighting words 
that was “not limited to the favored topics.”46 Or, as Justice White put 
the point in a separate opinion, the majority in R.A.V. had invalidated 
the St. Paul ordinance on account of its determination that a “more 
restrictive alternative could adequately serve the compelling need 
identified by St. Paul lawmakers.”47 
Other free speech cases reveal a similar reliance on more 
restrictive means analysis. Recently, for instance, the Court struck 
down a content-discriminatory prohibition on the display of road 
 
 38. See, e.g., Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231, 
235–36 (2012); Barry P. McDonald, Speech and Distrust: Rethinking the Content Approach 
to Protecting the Freedom of Expression, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1348–49 (2006); 
Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 
113, 114 (1981); Stone, supra note 7 at 205. 
 39. For an analysis of earlier cases, see Lee, supra note 11, at 637, 637 n.3. 
 40. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).  
 41. Id. at 380. 
 42. Id. at 381. 
 43. Id. at 382. 
 44. Id. at 391. 
 45. Id. The latter part of this conclusion was controversial, given that the ordinance 
drew its content-based distinction within a category of so-called “unprotected speech.” See 
id. at 401 (White, J., concurring). Nevertheless, as the R.A.V. majority made clear, 
content-discriminatory laws remained constitutionally suspect even when applied to 
subsets of unprotected speech. Id. at 387 (majority opinion). 
 46. Id. at 395–96.  
 47. Id. at 404 n.5 (White, J., concurring). 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2017) 
22 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96 
signs, focusing its attention on the “hopelessly underinclusive” nature 
of the law’s coverage.48 The government had claimed, for instance, an 
interest in preserving aesthetics, but, as the majority opinion 
skeptically noted, it had simultaneously “allow[ed] [the] unlimited 
proliferation of larger ideological signs while strictly limiting the 
number, size, and duration of smaller directional ones.”49 Similarly, 
the government had claimed an interest in promoting traffic safety. 
But it had failed to offer any “reason to believe that directional signs 
pose a greater threat to safety than do ideological or political signs.”50 
The government, to be sure, had identified plausible justifications for 
its limitations on the placement of road signs, but it had failed to limit 
such signage in a sufficiently restrictive way.51 In that way, then, the 
more restrictive alternative of a stricter anti-sign ordinance 
contributed to the constitutional invalidity of the law under review.52 
The availability of a more restrictive means, however, has not 
always spelled the doom of a speech-infringing law. In Burson v. 
Freeman,53 the Court considered a content-based prohibition on 
political campaigning at polling places, said to be necessary in light of 
the state’s interests in preventing voter intimidation and election 
fraud.54 A plurality of Justices held that the law withstood strict 
scrutiny, even while appearing to acknowledge that the state could 
have just as easily achieved its interests by extending the ban to 
 
 48. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 2232. 
 51. Id. 
 52. R.A.V. and Gilbert by no means exhaust the universe of free-speech cases in which 
the Court has approvingly cited to a more restrictive alternative as grounds for 
invalidating a less restrictive law. In Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980), for instance, the 
Court struck down an Illinois anti-picketing ordinance that exempted certain forms of 
picketing related to a labor dispute. Id. at 457. Illinois defended the law by referencing a 
government interest in promoting residential privacy. Id. at 462. But this argument failed, 
the Court held, in light of the statute’s failure to restrict labor-related picketing, which was 
“equally likely to intrude on the tranquility of the home.” Id.; see also Police Dep’t of 
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 100 (1972) (“If peaceful labor picketing is permitted, there 
is no justification for prohibiting all nonlabor picketing, both peaceful and nonpeaceful. 
‘Peaceful’ nonlabor picketing, however the term ‘peaceful’ is defined, is obviously no more 
disruptive than ‘peaceful’ labor picketing. But Chicago’s ordinance permits the latter and 
prohibits the former.”). Dissenting from the Court’s holding, then-Justice Rehnquist was 
quick to notice (and criticize) the Court’s reliance on a “more restrictive means.” Carey, 
447 U.S. at 475 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). As he put it, the Court’s approach led to the 
strange and counterintuitive result that “the State would fare better by adopting more 
restrictive means, a judicial incentive I had thought this Court would hesitate to afford.” 
Id. For additional examples of such cases, see generally Lee, supra note 11. 
 53. 504 U.S. 191 (1992).  
 54. Id. at 198–99. 
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encompass both political and nonpolitical solicitation at polling 
places.55 According to the plurality, however, the law’s “failure to 
regulate all speech” did not “render[] [it] fatally underinclusive,” 
given the absence of “evidence that political candidates have used 
other forms of solicitation or exit polling to commit [] electoral 
abuses.”56 Thus, the state’s failure to enact a more restrictive 
alternative was excused on the ground that “[t]he First Amendment 
does not require States to regulate for problems that do not exist.”57 
Similarly, in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar,58 the Court again cast 
aside a proposed more restrictive alternative when it upheld a Florida 
prohibition on political fundraising by judicial candidates.59 The state 
defended the law as necessary to preserve both the actuality and 
appearance of “judicial integrity” within the court system,60 and the 
challenger responded by claiming, inter alia, that the law failed to 
pursue these interests in a sufficiently restrictive fashion.61 
Specifically, the challenger argued, the law lacked narrow tailoring on 
account of its failure to reach additional forms of integrity-impairing 
behavior: among other things, for instance, Florida did not prohibit 
third-party communications made on behalf of judicial candidates, 
even though those communications “arguably reduce[d] public 
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary just as much as a judge’s 
personal solicitation.”62 But the Court waved the argument away. 
Reasoning that “[i]t is always somewhat counterintuitive to argue that 
a law violates the First Amendment by abridging too little speech,” 
the Court went on to conclude that the law raised “no fatal 
underinclusivity concerns.”63 This was so, the Court explained, 
because “personal solicitation by judicial candidates implicates a 
different problem than solicitation by campaign committees,” and “a 
State may conclude that they present markedly different appearances 
to the public.”64 And, quoting Burson, the Court reiterated that “[t]he 
 
 55. Id. at 207. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015). 
 59. Id. at 1673. 
 60. Id. at 1666. 
 61. Id. at 1668. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 1669; see also Calvert, supra note 11, at 561 (noting that the “key” to the 
Court’s “logic” in Williams-Yulee was “the alleged noncomparability between the 
regulated and unregulated varieties of speech”). 
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First Amendment does not require States to regulate for problems 
that do not exist.”65 
Other free speech cases have left the problem of more restrictive 
alternatives largely unexplored. Consider, for instance, Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project,66 in which the Court upheld against First 
Amendment attack a federal statute making it a crime to “knowingly 
provid[e] material support or resources to a foreign terrorist 
organization.”67 This statute, the Court held, was content-based in 
that its coverage both (a) encompassed verbal communications with 
terrorist groups, and (b) depended on what those communications 
expressed.68 Even so, the statute withstood heightened scrutiny,69 with 
the Court concluding that the burdens imposed on materially 
supportive speech were sufficiently well tailored to a compelling 
governmental interest in “combating terrorism,” and that there 
existed no less restrictive means of achieving those interests in a 
comparably effective way.70 Left unanalyzed, however, was the 
question whether Congress might have pursued this interest by simply 
prohibiting all communications directed at foreign terrorist 
organizations, regardless of their content. Such a more restrictive 
means would have mitigated (if not eliminated) the content-
discriminatory features of the statute, without in any obvious manner 
frustrating the government’s pursuit of the “terrorism prevention” 
interest that was said to necessitate the content-based ban. Even on 
 
 65. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1670 (quoting Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 207 
(1992)); see also McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2532 (2014) (rejecting the claim 
that Massachusetts should have dealt with the problem of protests at abortion clinics via 
the more restrictive alternative of a “buffer zone” requirement that covered “‘every 
building in the State that hosts any activity that might occasion protest or comment,’ not 
just abortion clinics” (citing Brief for Petitioner at 24, McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 
2518 (2014) (No. 12-1168), 2013 WL 4829340, at *24)). 
 66. 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
 67. Id. at 8 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §	2339B (2006)). 
 68. Id. at 27. The statute would apply, for instance, if a speaker provided instruction 
regarding a “specific skill” or communicated “specialized knowledge,” but it would not 
apply if the speaker imparted “only general or unspecialized knowledge.” Id. 
 69. Id. at 28. As Professor Volokh has noted, it is not altogether clear whether the 
Court in Humanitarian Law Project understood itself to be applying “strict scrutiny” or a 
somewhat more lenient standard. Eugene Volokh, Speech That Aids Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations, and Strict Scrutiny, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 21, 2010), 
http://volokh.com/2010/06/21/speech-that-aids-foreign-terrorist-organizations-and-strict-
scrutiny [https://perma.cc/9GNA-XL9M]. 
 70. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 28–32. Specifically, the Court rejected the 
claim that Congress might have prohibited only those forms of material support that aided 
the “peaceable, lawful conduct” of foreign terrorist groups. Id. at 32; see also id. at 46 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority that the statute reflected the “least 
restrictive means” of achieving the government’s terrorism-prevention interests). 
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the premises accepted by the majority in Humanitarian Law Project, 
there seemed to exist a potentially relevant more restrictive (and 
content-neutral) means of serving the government’s interest. 
Nevertheless, in an arguable departure from the approach taken in 
R.A.V., Reed, and Burson, the Court in Humanitarian Law Project 
did not consider the doctrinal implications of that fact, let alone 
acknowledge its existence. 
B. Free Exercise 
In Employment Division v. Smith,71 the Court significantly 
narrowed the reach of the Free Exercise Clause, holding that the First 
Amendment permitted the government to “impose an ‘incidental 
effect’” on religious practices through the enactment and 
enforcement of “neutral law[s] of general applicability.”72 Smith thus 
transitioned the law out of an old regime in which the Court closely 
reviewed all laws that burdened religious practices and into a new 
regime in which the Court closely reviewed only those laws that 
targeted religion.73 The practical implications of the decision were 
clear: governments could insulate religion-burdening laws against free 
exercise attack by broadening rather than narrowing their 
applicability. That, in turn, created opportunities for the Court to 
invoke the availability of a more restrictive alternative as a ground for 
invalidating a religion-targeting law. 
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah74 
illustrates the point. Adherents to the Santeria faith challenged a set 
of rules regarding the ritualized killing of animals, claiming 
discrimination on the basis of their religious beliefs.75 The Supreme 
Court agreed with the challengers, concluding that the animal 
sacrifice laws were not in fact neutral or generally applicable with 
respect to religion. Why? Largely due to the availability of more 
restrictive alternatives that could have just as easily served the 
interests associated with the less restrictive enactments. Specifically, 
the City had argued that its ordinance helped to “protect[] the public 
 
 71. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 72. Id. at 879, 882 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)). 
 73. Id. at 882. The Court in Smith did recognize certain exceptions to this rule, noting, 
for instance, that heightened scrutiny might remain when a generally applicable law 
simultaneously implicated the free-exercise right and some other right, id. at 881–82 
(citing, inter alia, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)), or when a generally applicable 
law “lent itself to individualized governmental assessment” of particular forms of conduct, 
id. at 883–84 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)). 
 74. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 75. Id. at 528. 
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health” and “prevent[] cruelty to animals.”76 Both interests, however, 
could have been furthered by laws that applied to a wider range of 
nonreligious practices. As to the “animal cruelty” interest, the City’s 
argument failed because its law did not forbid (and indeed sometimes 
explicitly authorized) several nonreligious animal-killing practices—
practices such as “fishing,” “euthanasia of stray, neglected, 
abandoned, or unwanted animals,” “the infliction of pain or suffering 
in the interest of medical science,” and the “hunt[ing] [of] wild 
hogs.”77 
Likewise, as to the “public health” interest, the City had again 
pursued the goal too narrowly, failing to regulate, say, “hunters[] 
bringing their kill to their houses,” or “restaurants” that 
“improper[ly] dispos[ed] of garbage.”78 Had the City criminalized a 
wider range of animal-harming practices (including, but not limited 
to, the ritual slaughter of animals), its law would have qualified as 
more “generally applicable” and thus less constitutionally 
problematic. But because the City had not pursued its interests by 
way of a more restrictive means, its ordinances ran afoul of the Free 
Exercise Clause.79 Or, as Justice Blackmun stated in a separate 
opinion, “[i]f the State’s goal is important enough to prohibit 
religiously motivated activity, it will not and must not stop at 
religiously motivated activity.”80 
As in the free speech context, however, the Court has not always 
treated the availability of a more restrictive alternative as fatal to the 
constitutionality of a religion-related law. In Locke v. Davey,81 
decided some eleven years after Lukumi, the Court upheld a 
Washington scholarship program that specifically excluded students 
of devotional theology.82 Invoking Smith, the Court held the program 
 
 76. Id. at 543. 
 77. Id. at 543–44. 
 78. Id. at 544. 
 79. Id. at 567–77. 
 80. Id. at 578–79 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Lower courts, too, have embraced 
similar reasoning in the Free Exercise context, faulting the government for its failure to 
pursue a regulatory objective in a sufficiently restrictive manner. See, e.g., Fraternal Order 
of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 366 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting 
that a police department’s willingness to grant medical exemptions from a policy 
prohibiting officers from wearing beards undercut its justifications for refusing to grant 
religious exemptions from the policy). For a helpful overview of such cases, see generally 
Duncan, supra note 11, at 868–83 (noting that Lukumi made “underinclusion” an 
“earmark[] of laws which, although facially neutral with respect to religion, nonetheless 
fail to satisfy the general applicability requirement”). 
 81. 540 U.S. 712 (2003). 
 82. Id. at 725. 
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did not target religion in a problematic way. That was so, the Court 
explained, because Washington could justify the theology exclusion 
by reference to a valid state interest in avoiding the “establishment” 
or endorsement of religion over nonreligion.83 This “historic and 
substantial” interest in avoiding an improper establishment of religion 
was sufficient to defeat the conclusion that state’s scholarship 
program was “inherently constitutionally suspect” on Free Exercise 
grounds.84 
The Court’s reasoning in Davey highlighted the inadequacy of 
various less restrictive alternatives to the program under review: if the 
state were to afford more generous treatment to devotional theology 
students, the Court explained, its “antiestablishment” aims would 
necessarily be compromised.85 But, as Justice Scalia pointed out in his 
dissent, the Court never explored the alternative possibility of a more 
restrictive approach to the problem—specifically, Washington might 
instead have avoided Establishment Clause difficulties by simply 
terminating the scholarship program in its entirety.86 If the state were 
truly serious about disassociating itself from religious instruction, it 
could have exited the educational arena altogether—thus avoiding 
the provision of both direct support and indirect support of 
institutions that did in fact promote various religious beliefs.87 Thus, 
much as the Court did in Lukumi, it might have done (but did not do) 
in Davey—fault the state for its failure to pursue its regulatory 
interests in a sufficiently restrictive manner. 
C. Equal Protection 
In contrast to its First Amendment decisions, the Court’s equal 
protection decisions have only infrequently relied on more restrictive 
means analysis to strike down constitutionally suspect laws. But such 
analysis is not entirely absent from the case law. Consider, for 
instance, the majority opinion in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
 
 83. Id. at 724–25. 
 84. Id. at 725. 
 85. Id. at 721–22. 
 86. Id. at 728–29 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The State could also simply abandon the 
scholarship program altogether. If that seems a dear price to pay for freedom of 
conscience, it is only because the State has defined that freedom so broadly that it would 
be offended by a program with such an incidental, indirect religious effect.”). 
 87. See Antony Barone Kolenc, “Mr. Scalia’s Neighborhood”: A Home for Minority 
Religions?, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 819, 851 (2007) (noting that Justice Scalia’s reasoning in 
Davey “could lead government officials to take actions that amount to less funding for 
religious programs across the board”). 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2017) 
28 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96 
Center.88 A municipal zoning ordinance required the issuance of a 
“special use permit” for the operation of group homes for individuals 
with mental disabilities.89 Having been denied such a permit, the 
plaintiffs challenged the rule under the Equal Protection Clause, 
claiming that it unlawfully discriminated on the basis of disability.90 
Although the Court declined to treat the law’s classification as 
“suspect” or “quasi-suspect,”91 it nonetheless struck down the law, via 
the application of what commentators would later call “rational basis 
with bite” review.92 In so doing, the Court made short shrift of a 
variety of proffered justifications for the City’s permitting scheme, 
focusing first and foremost on the City’s relatively more lenient 
treatment of other parties not before the Court.93 For example, the 
City had claimed an interest in protecting group home residents from 
the risk of a flood; but this argument would not do, the Court held, 
because it could not support the law’s “distinction between the 
Featherston home and, for example, nursing homes, homes for 
convalescents or the aged, or sanitariums or hospitals, any of which 
could be located on the Featherston site without obtaining a special 
use permit.”94 Similarly, the City expressed a concern about “the legal 
responsibility for actions” that the home’s residents might take.95 But 
that argument failed, given the lack of permitting requirements 
demanded of boarding houses and fraternity houses.96 Additionally, 
the City expressed concern about the size of the home and the large 
number of its residents. But that argument foundered on the 
complete absence of restrictions for “boarding house[s], nursing 
home[s], family dwelling[s], fraternity house[s], or dormitor[ies].”97 
Finally, the City defended its permit denial as “aimed at avoiding 
concentration of population and at lessening congestion of the 
streets.”98 But again, “[t]hese concerns obviously fail to explain why 
apartment houses, fraternity and sorority houses, hospitals and the 
like, may freely locate in the area without a permit.”99 In short, 
 
 88. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 89. Id. at 435. 
 90. Id. at 437. 
 91. Id. at 442–47. 
 92. Id. at 447–50; see also Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: 
Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 793–96 (1987). 
 93. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447. 
 94. Id. at 449. 
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virtually every time the City claimed an interest on behalf of its 
permitting decision, the Court responded by identifying a more 
restrictive alternative that the City had chosen not to pursue.100 
Consider also the recent litigation concerning the 
constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans. The Court itself did not 
invoke more restrictive alternatives in holding that such bans violated 
the Constitution,101 but some lower courts did do so while teeing the 
issue up for Supreme Court review. In striking down two such laws 
from Wisconsin and Indiana, for instance, the Seventh Circuit placed 
special emphasis on these states’ failure to withhold marriage benefits 
from sterile, opposite-sex couples—a failure that undercut the states’ 
attempt to characterize their marriage laws as devices designed to 
deal with the aftermath of “accidental” pregnancies.102 In striking 
down a similar Virginia law, the Fourth Circuit pointed out that the 
state’s continued willingness to recognize the marriages of infertile 
opposite-sex couples rendered its same-sex marriage restriction 
“woefully underinclusive.”103 Other courts have reached similar 
conclusions.104 In sum, the pre-Obergefell cases often found fault in 
the states’ refusal to extend their prohibitions on marriage as far as 
the stated justifications for those prohibitions would have demanded. 
But more restrictive alternatives have not always paved the way 
to equal protection success. In Michael M. v. Superior Court,105 for 
instance, the Court waved away a posited more restrictive alternative 
in a California law that made it a crime for underage males (but not 
underage females) to engage in non-marital sexual intercourse with 
 
 100. Id. at 448–50; see also Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered 
Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945, 955 (2004) (noting that “the Court implied that the 
extraordinarily underinclusive nature of the classification so poorly served the ostensible 
purposes of concern about the number of residents and the home’s location on a flood 
plain that it freed the Court from reliance on such hypothetical purposes”). 
 101. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597–605 (2015). 
 102. See Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 661 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The state treats married 
homosexuals as would-be ‘free riders’ on heterosexual marriage, unreasonably reaping 
benefits intended by the state for fertile couples. But infertile couples are free riders too. 
Why are they allowed to reap the benefits accorded marriages of fertile couples, and 
homosexuals are not?”). 
 103. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 381 (4th Cir. 2014) (“If Virginia sought to ensure 
responsible procreation via the Virginia Marriage Laws, the laws are woefully 
underinclusive. Same-sex couples are not the only category of couples who cannot 
reproduce accidentally. For example, opposite-sex couples cannot procreate 
unintentionally if they include a post-menopausal woman or an individual with a medical 
condition that prevents unassisted conception.”). 
 104. See, e.g., Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1081 (10th Cir. 2014) (“And Oklahoma 
permits infertile opposite-sex couples to marry despite the fact that they, as much as same-
sex couples, might raise non-biological children.”). 
 105. 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (plurality opinion). 
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another underage party.106 No one on the Court appeared to dispute 
the importance of the interest asserted on behalf of the law—namely, 
that of “preventing [out-of-wedlock teenage] pregnancies”—nor did 
the Justices disagree that the prohibition helped to achieve that 
interest to some extent.107 What was disputed was whether the state 
could justifiably exempt underage females from the prohibition—
whether, in other words, the state should be faulted for its failure to 
pursue the more restrictive alternative of a gender-neutral prohibition 
on underage sex.108 
Justice Rehnquist’s plurality opinion answered no, for two 
separate reasons. First, Justice Rehnquist credited the state’s 
assertion that a male-only prohibition helped to “equalize” burdens 
across the sexes.109 Since “virtually all of the significant harmful and 
inescapably identifiable consequences of teenage pregnancy fall on 
the young female,” legally imposed (and male-exclusive) burdens of 
criminal punishment approximated some of the physically imposed 
(and female-exclusive) burdens of an unwanted pregnancy.110 And 
second, Rehnquist accepted the state’s contentions that a more 
restrictive means might prove less effective at deterring the 
prohibited behavior.111 More specifically, 
[the State’s] view is that a female is surely less likely to report 
violations of the statute if she herself would be subject to 
criminal prosecution. In an area already fraught with 
prosecutorial difficulties, we decline to hold that the Equal 
Protection Clause requires a legislature to enact a statute so 
broad that it may well be incapable of enforcement.112 
Thus, the plurality found itself “unable to accept petitioner’s 
contention that the statute .	.	. must, in order to pass judicial scrutiny, 
be broadened so as to hold the female as criminally liable as the 
male.”113 
The Court was similarly dismissive of more restrictive 
alternatives when, in Nguyen v. INS,114 it upheld a set of gender-based 
rules governing the citizenship claims of children born abroad to 
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 108. Id. at 490–91 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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 114. 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
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unmarried couples of mixed citizenship.115 The terms of the law varied 
depending on whether the “citizen-parent” of the child—i.e., the 
member of the couple with U.S. citizenship—was male or female, 
with children of citizen-fathers subject to more onerous procedural 
and evidentiary requirements than children of citizen-mothers.116 The 
government defended this scheme on the ground that citizen-fathers 
presented special evidentiary difficulties that citizen-mothers did 
not,117 but that argument invited an obvious retort: Even if citizen-
fathers posed special problems, why not subject both citizen-mother 
and citizen-father claims to the more onerous set of requirements that 
only the latter currently received?118 Why not, in other words, simply 
require the government to pursue its interests by way of a more 
restrictive alternative—one that simply imposed on citizen-mother 
children the heightened set of requirements that citizen-father 
children already faced? 
To this question, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion offered two 
brief responses. The first centered on regulatory difficulties: 
expanding the evidentiary demands on everyone, Justice Kennedy 
suggested, would increase “the subjectivity, intrusiveness, and 
difficulties of proof that might attend an inquiry into any particular 
bond or tie.”119 Congress was therefore entitled to maintain the more 
“easily administered scheme” it had chosen to put in place.120 Second, 
the majority observed that heightening the evidentiary burdens on 
citizen-mother children “would be to insist on a hollow neutrality,” 
given that a “facially neutral rule would sometimes require fathers to 
take additional affirmative steps which would not be required of 
mothers.”121 The real “biological differences” that existed between 
 
 115. Id. at 71. 
 116. Id. at 59–60. 
 117. Among other things, as the Court pointed out, “proof of motherhood” was 
“inherent in birth itself” whereas proof of fatherhood was not, and that fact would, on 
average, make citizen-mother relationships easier to verify. Id. at 62–64. 
 118. See id. at 79 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority opinion “casually 
dismisses the relevance of available sex-neutral alternatives”). Just recently, the Court 
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Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1686 (2017). In so doing, however, the Court reaffirmed its 
earlier decision in Nguyen, observing that “imposing a paternal-acknowledgement 
requirement on fathers [is] a justifiable, easily met means of ensuring the existence of a 
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1694. 
 119. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 69. 
 120. Id. 
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men and women, in other words, would likely render formally neutral 
rules non-neutral in effect, and that fact helped to excuse Congress’s 
failure to process immigration applications in a more restrictive 
manner.122 
The Court assumed a similarly dismissive attitude toward more 
restrictive means analysis in Rostker v. Goldberg,123 in which it upheld 
the male-only registration requirements of the federal Selective 
Service Act.124 True, the Court acknowledged, Congress might have 
pursued its interest in “raising and supporting armies” through the 
“alternative means” of requiring both men and women to register for 
the draft,125 but that fact did not doom the gender-based requirements 
under review.126 Among other things, the Court explained, the more 
restrictive alternative might turn out to serve the government’s 
interest less well.127 For example, the legislative record had revealed 
concerns that “training would be needlessly burdened by women 
recruits who could not be used in combat,”128 that “administrative 
problems such as housing and different treatment with regard to 
dependency, hardship and physical standards would also exist,”129 and 
that “staffing non-combat positions with women during a 
mobilization would be positively detrimental to the important goal of 
military flexibility.”130 Thus, the Court concluded the less restrictive, 
male-only draft was justified for the simple reason that “Congress 
simply did not consider it worth the added burdens of including 
women in draft and registration plans.”131 
D. Substantive Due Process 
The Court has sometimes employed more restrictive means 
analysis when evaluating privacy- and autonomy-related claims under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Consider, for 
instance, Justice Powell’s plurality opinion in Moore v. City of East 
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Cleveland.132 An East Cleveland housing ordinance forbade 
cohabitation by non-family members and further defined “family” to 
exclude a variety of non-nuclear familial relationships.133 The Court 
invalidated the law as an unconstitutional abridgement of “choices 
concerning family living arrangements.”134 Key to this determination 
was the plurality’s conclusion that the ordinance bore only a “tenuous 
relation” to the “legitimate goals” of “preventing overcrowding,” 
“minimizing traffic and parking congestion,” and “avoiding an undue 
financial burden on East Cleveland’s school system.”135 Justice Powell 
did not dispute that these goals were legitimate or that the 
cohabitation restrictions bore some connection to them.136 The 
problem for East Cleveland lay in its unduly permissive treatment of 
persons not covered by the law.137 For example, “the ordinance 
permits any family consisting only of husband, wife, and unmarried 
children to live together, even if the family contains a half dozen 
licensed drivers, each with his or her own car.”138 In addition, “[t]he 
ordinance would permit a grandmother to live with a single 
dependent son and children, even if his school age children number a 
dozen.”139 The law’s failure to police overcrowding more aggressively 
thus contributed to the plurality’s finding that it was unconstitutional 
as written. 
Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman140 advanced 
an argument along similar lines.141 Having concluded that a 
Connecticut contraceptive ban implicated fundamental liberty 
interests,142 Justice Harlan went on to ask whether the ban might 
nonetheless be justified in light of the state’s countervailing interests 
in promoting morality.143 The answer, Harlan reasoned, was an 
emphatic no.144 Nothing the state had argued “even remotely suggests 
a justification for the obnoxiously intrusive means it has chosen to 
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effectuate [the] policy.”145 And this was so in part due to the state’s 
lackadaisical enforcement of the law itself.146 As Harlan put the point, 
the very circumstance that Connecticut has not chosen to press 
the enforcement of this statute against individual users, while it 
nevertheless persists in asserting its right to do so at any time—
in effect a right to hold this statute as an imminent threat to the 
privacy of the households of the State—conduces to the 
inference either that it does not consider the policy of the 
statute a very important one, or that it does not regard the 
means it has chosen for its effectuation as appropriate or 
necessary.147 
In Harlan’s view, then, the unused, more restrictive alternative of a 
regularly enforced contraceptive ban severely undercut Connecticut’s 
justifications for the law under review.148 
Consider finally the Court’s response to Texas’s claim in Roe v. 
Wade149 that its prohibition on abortions helped to safeguard the 
Fourteenth Amendment rights of unborn fetuses.150 Although the 
Court’s refutation of the argument relied primarily on textual 
considerations, Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion also pointed to 
various non-restrictive features of the Texas law as further militating 
against the state’s argument.151 In particular 
[w]hen Texas urges that a fetus is entitled to Fourteenth 
Amendment protection as a person, it faces a dilemma. Neither 
in Texas nor in any other State are all abortions prohibited. 
Despite broad proscription, an exception always exists. The 
exception contained in Art. 1196, for an abortion procured or 
attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life 
of the mother, is typical. But if the fetus is a person who is not 
to be deprived of life without due process of law, and if the 
mother’s condition is the sole determinant, does not the Texas 
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exception appear to be out of line with the Amendment’s 
command?152  
Additional features of the Texas law struck the majority as not 
restrictive enough to sustain the state’s “life of the fetus” justification: 
Texas law, for instance, did not treat the woman as “a principal or an 
accomplice with respect to an abortion upon her.”153 But, the Court 
asked, “[i]f the fetus is a person, why is the woman not a principal or 
an accomplice?”154 And finally, the majority observed that Texas 
penalized criminal abortion far less severely than it penalized criminal 
murder. Again, however, it wondered: “[i]f the fetus is a person, may 
the penalties be different?”155 In all these respects, then, the Court in 
Roe appeared to suggest that Texas’s failure to enact a more 
restrictive abortion ban—one without a “life of the mother” 
exception, one that extended accomplice liability to the mother, and 
one that employed harsher penalties—contributed to the 
unconstitutionality of the less restrictive ban under review.156 
E. Dormant Commerce Clause 
The “dormant” or “negative” Commerce Clause prohibits states 
from erecting protectionist barriers to the free flow of interstate 
commerce.157 Implementing this requirement, the Court has applied a 
“virtually per se rule of invalidity”158 to laws that discriminate 
between in-state and out-of-state parties. Under this rule, a facially 
discriminatory law survives attack only if “it advances a legitimate 
local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable 
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nondiscriminatory alternatives.”159 Consequently, the Court has 
sometimes pointed to the existence of a more restrictive means as a 
reason to invalidate a law under the “virtually per se rule.”160 When a 
state can achieve its “legitimate local objectives” by worsening its 
treatment of in-state parties, the Court will often have reason to 
strike down the facially discriminatory law under attack. 
In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,161 for instance, the Court 
invalidated a New Jersey prohibition on the in-state disposal of out-
of-state waste.162 Resisting the charge that it had engaged in 
impermissible economic protectionism, New Jersey characterized the 
law as a legitimate exercise of the state’s police powers, designed to 
protect New Jersey citizens from the health-and environmental-
hazards of overflowing landfills.163 But the Court rejected this 
argument, pointing to the possibility of utilizing other, facially neutral 
means of achieving those aims.164 In particular, as the Court observed, 
rather than simply target out-of-state garbage, “New Jersey may 
pursue those ends by slowing the flow of all waste into the State’s 
remaining landfills, even though interstate commerce may 
incidentally be affected.”165 Restating the point less charitably, Justice 
Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion highlighted the majority’s 
wholehearted embrace of more restrictive means analysis:  
New Jersey must either prohibit all landfill operations, leaving 
itself to cast about for a presently nonexistent solution to the 
serious problem of disposing of the waste generated within its 
own borders, or it must accept waste from every portion of the 
United States, thereby multiplying the health and safety 
problems which would result if it dealt only with such wastes 
generated within the state.166 
On the majority’s view, that is, New Jersey could achieve its health 
and safety interests in the more restrictive fashion of abolishing all 
landfills from its territory, and therefore its facially discriminatory 
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(but less restrictive) enactment could not pass constitutional 
muster.167 
A more recent decision from the Fourth Circuit, Beskind v. 
Ealey,168 relied even more explicitly on more restrictive means 
analysis in striking down a facially discriminatory law.169 North 
Carolina’s Alcoholic Beverage Control (“ABC”) laws imposed a 
complex set of restrictions on the importation of wine by out-of-state 
wineries.170 A consequence of the regulatory scheme was that in-state 
wineries could sell their products “directly” to in-state customers 
(thereby bypassing wholesalers and retailers altogether), whereas out-
of-state wineries generally could not.171 North Carolina defended the 
distinction by highlighting the difficulty of enforcing taxation 
requirements and other provisions of its ABC laws against out-of-
state actors: by channeling all out-of-state wine to in-state sellers, the 
argument went, North Carolina could more easily ensure that the out-
of-state wineries were in compliance with all of the relevant state-law 
restrictions.172 But even if this were true, the Fourth Circuit pointed 
out, there existed an obviously nondiscriminatory means of achieving 
North Carolina’s desired ends: namely, “requir[ing] in-state wines to 
pass through the same three-tiered scheme that all other wines must 
pass through.”173 North Carolina had argued the case as if the only 
nondiscriminatory alternative on the table involved extending to out-
of-state wineries the same lenient regulatory treatment that it already 
extended to in-state wineries.174 But that was not the only option. 
Because North Carolina had been “unable to explain why imposing 
the same restrictions on in-state wineries that it imposes on out-of-
state wineries would not be a reasonable nondiscriminatory 
alternative,” the facially discriminatory provisions of the ABC law 
could not be sustained.175 
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Consider by contrast the Court’s decision in Maine v. Taylor,176 
which upheld a facially discriminatory restriction on interstate 
commerce.177 Maine prohibited the importation of live baitfish from 
outside the state, citing an interest in protecting its local aquatic 
ecology against the threats posed by non-native species.178 Much of 
the Court’s analysis centered on the viability of various less restrictive 
alternatives that the challengers had proposed. The challengers had 
argued, for instance, that the state could allow the importation of live 
baitfish while inspecting out-of-state shipments for parasitic and non-
native species.179 The Court, however, found that these sorts of 
inspections posed practical difficulties that rendered them 
unworkable. Hence, the Maine law could stand because it “serve[d] 
legitimate local purposes that could not adequately be served by 
available nondiscriminatory alternatives.”180 
Curiously absent from the Court’s opinion was any analysis of 
more restrictive alternatives to the Maine baitfish law. Among these 
alternatives might have been a law that simply banned the sale 
(and/or use) of any and all live baitfish, whether or not imported into 
the state of Maine. Interstate baitfish sales would have remained 
prohibited, thus leaving Maine’s waterways equally well insulated 
against the special threats posed by non-native species. But purely in-
state baitfish sales would also have been prohibited, thus alleviating 
the problem of facial discrimination. That solution, to be sure, might 
well have been problematic for other reasons: perhaps it would have 
harmed the Maine fishing industry (and thus, by extension, the Maine 
economy as a whole) or perhaps it would still have proven unduly 
discriminatory in effect. But similar concerns were present in 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey181 and the Beskind182 case, and it is not 
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immediately obvious why Maine v. Taylor should have come out any 
differently.183 A total baitfish ban, after all, would have significantly 
reduced discriminatory treatment of in-state and out-of-state baitfish 
producers without in any way jeopardizing the state’s ability to 
protect its waterways against the introduction of non-native species. 
Even so, the Court in Maine v. Taylor never appeared to consider this 
possibility.184 
F. Equal Sovereignty 
One byway of constitutional federalism doctrine involves the so-
called “equal sovereignty” principle, which generally condemns the 
enactment of federal laws that treat some jurisdictions differently 
from others.185 The future of this principle remains uncertain—the 
Court leaned heavily on it in Shelby County v. Holder186 but without 
providing much detail as to (a) the scope of its operation, and (b) the 
applicable level of scrutiny triggered by laws that accord “disparate 
treatment of States.”187 But the doctrine plainly demands some level 
of means/ends fit manifested by laws that treat states unequally, such 
that courts now must ask whether differential treatment of state (and 
perhaps local) jurisdictions is sufficiently tailored to achieve a 
sufficiently important federal interest.188 That methodology brings 
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along with it the possibility that more restrictive means analysis might 
sometimes enter into the equal sovereignty calculus. When Congress 
could just as well achieve its interests by increasing, rather than 
decreasing, the regulatory burdens on states it has singled out for 
favorable treatment, should that possibility militate in favor of 
invalidating the less burdensome, but more discriminatory, law under 
attack? 
The Third Circuit briefly entertained a question of this sort when 
confronting a constitutional challenge to the federal Professional and 
Amateur Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”).189 PASPA outlaws 
sports betting across the United States, while exempting Nevada, 
Delaware, Oregon, and Montana from the full force of its 
prohibitions.190 New Jersey challenged the law, relying in part on an 
equal sovereignty argument. The law violated the equal sovereignty 
of the states, New Jersey claimed, by according special treatment to a 
select handful of state jurisdictions. The court rejected this argument 
on several grounds, one of which involved the claim that PASPA’s 
interstate discrimination was justified in light of the purposes it was 
meant to serve.191 New Jersey’s argument to the contrary was 
straightforward—if the aim of PASPA was to eliminate the evils of 
sports gambling, then any state-specific carve-out made no sense. A 
far more effective—and nondiscriminatory alternative—would have 
been a more restrictive law that prohibited sports gambling 
everywhere. 
The court’s response to this claim was twofold. First, it 
contended that New Jersey had “distort[ed] PASPA’s purpose as 
being to wipe out sports gambling altogether.”192 Rather, the true 
purpose of the law was “to stop the spread of state-sanctioned sports 
gambling,” in light of which “regulating states in which sports-
wagering already existed would have been irrational.”193 Prohibiting 
gambling in all states would not have promoted this “anti-spreading” 
 
 189. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 214 (3d Cir. 
2013). 
 190. The scope of the carve-out varies within each of the exempted states, with the 
statute permitting only those forms of sports betting that the state had authorized prior to 
PASPA’s enactment. See Thomas B. Colby, Revitalizing the Forgotten Uniformity 
Constraint on the Commerce Power, 91 VA. L. REV. 249, 250 n.3 (2005). 
 191. The court also reasoned that the equal sovereignty principle did not apply with 
full force to laws enacted pursuant to the commerce power and/or touching on matters 
“outside the context of ‘sensitive areas of state and local policymaking.’” Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n, 730 F.3d at 238–39 (quoting Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2624). 
 192. Id. at 239.  
 193. Id. 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2017) 
2017] MORE RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVES 41 
interest any more effectively, given that the exempted states had 
already sanctioned sports-gambling as of the date of PASPA’s 
enactment. Second, the court questioned the sincerity of New Jersey’s 
own position. New Jersey, after all, had not asked the court to 
invalidate PASPA’s carve-out for exempted states, but it had instead 
asked the court to invalidate PASPA in its entirety (thus, in effect, 
leaving states free to permit sports-gambling everywhere).194 New 
Jersey, the court contended, was trying to have its cake and eat it too: 
invoking the existence of a more restrictive alternative as a means of 
obtaining its preferred remedy of a less restrictive regulatory regime. 
“That New Jersey seeks Nevada’s preferential treatment,” as the 
court put it, “and not a complete ban on the preferences,” thus 
“undermines [its] invocation of the equal sovereignty doctrine.”195 
The foregoing discussion reveals, if nothing else, that courts have 
taken a wide variety of approaches to more restrictive means analysis 
in adjudicating constitutional cases. Inconsistencies have emerged 
both within and across different doctrinal fields: sometimes courts 
have faulted government actors for failing to pursue a given 
regulatory objective in a more restrictive manner, and sometimes 
courts have excused them from doing so. And still other times courts 
have simply ignored the issue altogether. This hodgepodge of results 
suggests that courts lack a systematic framework for thinking through 
the question of when, if ever, the relative lenience of a legal measure 
should function as a reason for its invalidation. The remainder of this 
Article thus attempts to develop such a framework, while also 
offering prescriptive insights about the implementation of more 
restrictive means analysis in future cases. 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPORT OF MORE RESTRICTIVE 
ALTERNATIVES 
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, more restrictive 
alternatives are typically invoked in response to the government’s 
claim that a given regulatory interest justifies the enactment of a 
constitutionally suspect law. The aim, in other words, is to 
demonstrate an insufficient means/ends fit between the law being 
challenged and the interests it is said to serve. But how, in particular, 
does a more restrictive alternative serve to accomplish this goal? 
What is the underlying logic supporting the connection between the 
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availability of a more restrictive alternative, and the conclusion that 
the less restrictive law fails to pass constitutional muster? 
This Part suggests that more restrictive alternatives might 
support at least one of two different types of attacks on a 
constitutionally suspect law. First, a more restrictive alternative might 
support an equality-based attack on the law, which purports to show 
that the government has unnecessarily utilized a disfavored form of 
discriminatory treatment to pursue interests that it could just as well 
achieve in a nondiscriminatory fashion. Second, a more restrictive 
alternative might support a sincerity-based argument against the law, 
which, by showing how much more effectively the more restrictive 
alternative could achieve a stated regulatory interest, functions to cast 
doubt on the government’s actual commitment to the interest it has 
invoked. Put differently, the equality-based argument faults the 
government for needlessly discriminating, whereas the sincerity-based 
argument faults the government for failing to pursue its interests with 
sufficient vigor and aggressiveness. These two arguments, to be sure, 
may sometimes overlap. But they will often rest on different 
assumptions regarding the constitutional significance of a more 
restrictive alternative and raise different implications regarding the 
range of options available to the government in rebutting a 
challenger’s claims. 
A. The Equality-Based Argument 
With one exception,196 the doctrines considered in the previous 
Part share the following important feature: each doctrine singles out 
for heightened means/ends scrutiny a form of regulatory treatment 
that discriminates on the basis of a constitutionally suspect criterion. 
In the free speech context, for instance, the Court has held that 
content-based laws trigger strict scrutiny, whereas content-neutral 
laws trigger intermediate scrutiny.197 In the free exercise context, the 
Court has distinguished between religion-targeting laws, which trigger 
strict scrutiny, and laws that are neutral and generally applicable with 
respect to religion, which trigger no free-exercise scrutiny at all.198 In 
the equal protection context, the Court applies strict scrutiny to laws 
that employ suspect classifications such as race and alienage; it applies 
intermediate scrutiny to laws that discriminate on the basis of gender; 
and it applies rational basis scrutiny to laws that discriminate on the 
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basis of some other non-suspect classification.199 Dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine calls for heightened scrutiny of laws that distinguish 
between out-of-state parties and in-state parties.200 And the equal 
sovereignty principle at least sometimes requires a more searching 
examination of means/ends fit when a federal law draws distinctions 
based on the identities of certain states.201  
This Article earlier posited a connection between more 
restrictive alternatives and nondiscriminatory alternatives, noting that 
governments can eliminate constitutionally suspect forms of 
discrimination by worsening a law’s regulatory treatment of a 
previously advantaged category of conduct. Absolute increases in 
restrictiveness can in this way alleviate relative disparities in 
treatment. And when those disparities are themselves constitutionally 
suspect, more restrictive (and nondiscriminatory) alternatives can 
deliver the constitutional benefit of promoting formal equality where 
formal inequality previously prevailed. From this observation, it is not 
difficult to identify one mechanism through which the existence of a 
more restrictive alternative helps to demonstrate the constitutional 
invalidity of a less restrictive law. Simply put, the more restrictive 
alternative highlights the non-necessity of discrimination.202 Precisely 
because the more restrictive alternative provides a nondiscriminatory 
way to pursue the government’s goal, it functions to defeat the 
government’s claim that the goal itself warrants a facially problematic 
form of discriminatory treatment. 
Consider R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul. The majority struck down a 
content-based ban on a subcategory of fighting words by pointing to 
the availability of a more restrictive alternative—namely, a content-
neutral ban on all fighting words.203 St. Paul defended its ban by 
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reference to an interest in “ensur[ing] the basic human rights of 
members of groups that have historically been subjected to 
discrimination.”204 The majority acknowledged that the city had a 
compelling state interest in pursuing this goal, but it reasoned that a 
content-neutral “fighting words” ban—i.e., a ban that covered all 
fighting words including but not limited to those based on	race, color, 
creed, religion, or gender—would “have [had] precisely the same 
beneficial effect” in terms of the interest being sought.205 And given 
that the “dispositive question” in the case was whether “content 
discrimination is reasonably necessary to achieve St. Paul’s 
compelling interests,” the more restrictive (but nondiscriminatory) 
alternative effectively sealed the fate of the less restrictive (but 
discriminatory) law.206 Content discrimination was not reasonably 
related to St. Paul’s compelling government interests, because a 
nondiscriminatory, more restrictive alternative stood ready to achieve 
those interests in an equally “beneficial” way. 
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Beskind v. Easley—the wine 
importation case—utilized more restrictive means analysis in a similar 
fashion.207 Under well-established rules of dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine, states cannot facially discriminate against interstate 
commerce unless there exists no “reasonable nondiscriminatory 
alternative” capable of advancing the “legitimate local purpose” 
furthered by the law under review.208 In Beskind, North Carolina had 
attempted to justify its differential treatment of in-state wineries and 
out-of-state wineries by reference to a “legitimate local purpose” in 
preventing out-of-state wineries from circumventing various 
distribution and taxation requirements.209 But, as the Fourth Circuit 
pointed out, North Carolina could continue to achieve that interest by 
subjecting in-state wineries to the more burdensome regulatory 
treatment that the effective regulation of out-of-state wineries was 
said to require.210 That regulatory scheme would have been 
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discrimination that the doctrine expressly permitted—namely, the content-based targeting 
of an entire category of unprotected speech. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 
383–84 (1992). Thus, the more restrictive alternative of a categorical “fighting words” 
prohibition, even though content-based in a technical sense, still would not have 
discriminated in a constitutionally problematic manner. 
 204. Id. at 395. 
 205. Id. at 396.  
 206. Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 516 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 207. Id. at 516. 
 208. See, e.g., Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep’t of Env’t Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 101 (1994). 
 209. Beskind, 325 F.3d at 515 (quoting Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 100–01). 
 210. Id. 
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nondiscriminatory, and it would have served the state’s regulatory 
objectives in no less an effective way. And that was enough to 
condemn the state’s law in its current form. As the Fourth Circuit put 
it, the question in the case was not “whether North Carolina can 
advance its regulatory purpose by imposing fewer burdens on in-state 
wineries than out-of-state wineries.”211 Rather, it was “whether 
discriminating in favor of in-state wineries” helped to serve the state’s 
regulatory purposes,212 and the existence of a more restrictive 
alternative helped to demonstrate that the answer to this question 
was no.213 
In short, whenever an area of doctrine identifies discriminatory 
treatment as a constitutional evil,214 a more restrictive alternative 
might function to condemn a less restrictive law for the simple reason 
that that the former, unlike the latter, does not discriminate. The more 
restrictive means, in other words, identifies a desired middle path 
between the Scylla of disfavored discrimination and the Charybdis of 
unfulfilled regulatory needs. And the availability of such a middle 
path thus highlights an equality-based flaw in the less restrictive law 
under review. 
It bears emphasizing that in order to highlight an equality-based 
defect in a less restrictive law, a more restrictive means must 
necessarily qualify as nondiscriminatory in the relevant doctrinal 
sense; that is, the equality-based argument works only if the more 
restrictive means itself avoids the form of problematic discrimination 
that is manifested by the less restrictive law. It need not be the case, 
however, that the more restrictive (and nondiscriminatory) 
alternative would function to alleviate discriminatory effects. That is 
due to the well-established principle—recognized both within and 
outside of the equal protection context—that effects-based 
discrimination poses a lesser constitutional evil than does a facially or 
 
 211. Id. at 517. 
 212. Id. (emphasis in original) 
 213. Id. 
 214. As the foregoing discussion should make clear, an established constitutional 
presumption against discriminatory treatment is a necessary prerequisite to an equality-
based invocation of a more restrictive means. Equality-based defectiveness, that is, can 
exist only in connection with an established doctrinal presumption against some form of 
intentional or facial discrimination. And that in turn means that equality-based arguments 
need not themselves provide any explanation as to why the particular form of equality 
manifested by the more restrictive means (and flouted by the “less restrictive” law) is 
constitutionally valuable; that conclusion is already amply supported by the existence of a 
decision rule that presumptively condemns the form of discriminatory treatment at issue. 
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intentionally discriminatory law.215 Given this distinction—i.e., 
between facial/intentional discrimination on the one hand and 
unintentional/effects-based discrimination on the other—equality-
based invocations of a more restrictive alternative should not fail 
simply because the more restrictive alternative would give rise to 
lingering discriminatory effects. Put differently, if the Court seriously 
believes (as it repeatedly says it does) that formal rather than 
functional discrimination is the touchstone of unconstitutionality, 
then a more restrictive alternative need only qualify as a formally 
nondiscriminatory alternative in order to eliminate the 
constitutionally suspect form of discriminatory treatment under 
review. 
The Court, to be sure, has not always recognized this point, 
occasionally invoking the prospect of discriminatory effects as a 
reason not to demand adherence to a more restrictive alternative. 
Recall, for instance, Justice Kennedy’s assertion in Nguyen v. INS 
that the more restrictive alternative of subjecting citizen-mother 
children to a more onerous set of citizenship requirements would 
yield only a “hollow-neutrality” across gender-based lines, with the 
formally gender-neutral requirements still proving in practice more 
difficult for citizen-father applicants to satisfy.216 This is an argument 
 
 215. The reluctance to apply heightened scrutiny to effectively discriminatory laws is 
typically associated with equal protection cases such as Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 
(1976), and Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), in which the Court 
refused to apply heightened scrutiny to facially neutral laws that exerted problematic 
discriminatory effects. But the Court has embraced a similar distinction in many other 
areas of doctrine. With respect to the First Amendment’s content-discrimination principle, 
for instance, the Court has said that “[a] regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the 
content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some 
speakers or messages but not others.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S 781, 791 
(1989). With respect to the dormant Commerce Clause, the Court repeatedly distinguishes 
between “facially discriminatory,” measures on the one hand, and measures that 
“regulate[] evenhandedly with only incidental effects on interstate commerce.” Or. Waste 
Sys. v. Dep’t of Env’t Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994). In the free exercise context, 
Employment Division v. Smith virtually announced the principle on its face, given its 
explicit rejection of free exercise claims predicated on the effects of neutral and generally 
applicable laws. See Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 
1, 10 (1990) (noting that Smith makes “formal neutrality the dominant principle of the 
Court’s free exercise jurisprudence”). And while the Court has not yet said anything about 
the equal sovereignty principle’s application to facially neutral federal laws with 
discriminatory effects, the sheer number of such laws already on the books would likely 
militate against any sort of effects-based approach. Cf. Colby, supra note 188, at 1149–51. 
 216. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 64 (2001). The idea, in short, was that even a formally 
gender-neutral proof-of-parentage rule would sometimes require fathers to take 
“additional affirmative steps,” because mothers, by necessarily being present at the 
moment of a child’s birth, were more likely to have their name recorded on a child’s birth 
certificate. Id. 
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that, as Justice O’Connor noted in dissent, failed to take seriously the 
premium that the Justices had elsewhere placed on the value of 
formal neutrality (and instead took seriously a form of inequality 
whose doctrinal significance the Court had elsewhere minimized).217 
Put another way, by dismissing the more restrictive means as 
guaranteeing only “hollow neutrality,” the Court in Nguyen 
characterized as “hollow” the very sort of neutrality that equal 
protection doctrine routinely demands. And in so doing, the Court 
generated a result at odds with other features of the doctrine writ 
large.218 
B. The Sincerity-Based Argument 
More restrictive means analysis does not arise exclusively in 
connection with the claim that a law unnecessarily discriminates in 
pursuit of a legitimate regulatory objective. That point should be 
immediately evident from the fact that not all of the doctrines I 
considered in Part II single out discriminatory treatment as a trigger 
of heightened scrutiny. (The notable outlier is substantive due process 
doctrine, which calls for heightened scrutiny of all laws—whether 
discriminatory or not—that infringe on fundamental rights.)219 And in 
fact, many of the examples I discussed in Part II have utilized more 
restrictive means analysis not for the purpose of highlighting a 
nondiscriminatory means of achieving a stated regulatory objective, 
but instead for the purpose of questioning the government’s level of 
commitment to the objective said to justify the law under review. In 
this way can a more restrictive means function to demonstrate 
sincerity-related defects in a constitutionally suspect law.220 
 
 217. See id. at 82 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (contending that “the majority .	.	. 
denigrat[es] as ‘hollow’ the very neutrality that the law requires” (quoting id. at 64)). 
 218. Indeed, this feature of the majority opinion in Nguyen, along with others, has led 
to the suggestion that the majority did not in fact apply “intermediate scrutiny,” instead 
extending special deference to Congress in light of its plenary power over matters of 
immigration and naturalization. See, e.g., Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in 
Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 148 n.352 (2010) (“The 
disagreement between the majority and the dissent in Nguyen may partly have been a 
disagreement about the level of scrutiny that should apply in this case.”). 
 219. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1996). 
 220. To be sure, the Court need not (and often does not) explicitly invoke a more 
restrictive means in order to sustain a sincerity-based attack on a less restrictive law. 
Oftentimes, the attack proceeds simply by reference to curiously permissive or lenient 
features of a law that make little sense in light of the interest it purports to achieve. But 
even by pointing out these features of the law, the Court is still implicitly drawing 
attention to the government’s failure to regulate more restrictively. There is not much of a 
functional difference between saying: “this law doesn’t regulate A even though the interest 
would seem to require it,” or instead saying: “if the government had been serious about 
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The force of the sincerity-based argument derives from the 
notion that when the government invokes a “compelling,” 
“important,” “legitimate,” or otherwise sufficiently strong regulatory 
interest on a law’s behalf, that interest really ought to be the one that 
underlies the law. Even the most compelling government interest in 
the world cannot suffice to sustain a law that pursues that interest in 
an incomplete and halfhearted fashion. Rather, the intuition goes, a 
law must pursue that interest with some level of efficacy in order to 
claim the benefit of that interest’s justificatory force. Whatever its 
ultimate philosophical underpinnings,221 the gist of the idea has long 
been recognized and embraced by the Court. As the Court itself once 
put the point, “a law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest of 
the highest order .	.	. when it leaves appreciable damage to that 
supposedly vital interest unprohibited.”222 
This idea gives rise to a second mechanism by which a more 
restrictive alternative might function to highlight the 
unconstitutionality of a less restrictive law. Consider again Justice 
Blackmun’s suggestion in Roe v. Wade that Texas’s failure to 
criminalize abortions necessary to save the life of the mother counted 
 
pursuing this interest, it would have adopted a more restrictive alternative that 
encompassed the regulation of A.” Both claims point to the same underlying defect: 
namely, a lack of a genuine commitment to the regulatory interest that the government 
claims on behalf of a constitutionally suspect law. 
 221. We can imagine a variety of reasons why courts might care about the extent to 
which a law actually does further an interest invoked on its behalf. The idea may have 
something to do with concerns about subjective motives, positing that the less effectively a 
law promotes a legitimate government interest, the more likely it was that the legislature 
enacted the law to achieve some other illegitimate purpose. See Fallon, supra note 2, at 
1327; see also Volokh, Freedom of Speech, supra note 2, at 2420 (suggesting that a law’s 
“underinclusiveness .	.	. may be evidence that an interest is not compelling, because it 
suggests that the government itself doesn’t see the interest as compelling enough to justify 
a broader statute”). Relatedly, the intuition may stem from concerns about objective 
appearances: Even if the enactors of a less restrictive law intended for it to serve a 
legitimate interest, its patent inability at doing so might raise red flags in the eyes of 
outside observers who already have reason to doubt its constitutionality. See Republican 
Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 780 (2002) (“As a means of pursuing the objective 
.	.	. that respondents now articulate, the [law] is so woefully underinclusive as to render 
belief in that purpose a challenge to the credulous.”). Or perhaps the intuition states a 
point about proportionality or interest balancing, maintaining that courts should tolerate 
the liberty-related costs of a constitutionally suspect law only when those costs are 
outweighed by real and substantial regulatory gains. See Fallon, supra note 2, at 1327 
(“Even absent concern about governmental motives, the demand that restrictions on 
constitutional rights not be underinclusive reflects an insistence that the government not 
infringe on rights when doing so will predictably fail to achieve purportedly justifying 
goals.”). 
 222. Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 780 (quoting Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 
U.S. 524, 541–42 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). 
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as a further strike against the law under review.223 How could this 
seemingly lenient feature of the Texas law—one that spared women 
from an especially severe invasion of bodily autonomy—have 
contributed to its undoing? The answer, in short, had to do with a 
sincerity-related problem. Recall that Texas had claimed on behalf of 
its abortion ban a compelling—indeed, absolute—interest in 
safeguarding for unborn fetuses the right to life guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.224 But the state’s 
eschewal of a more restrictive alternative raised doubts in the 
majority’s minds about the veracity of this claim, suggesting that the 
protection of an absolute, Fourteenth Amendment “right to life” was 
not a regulatory object that Texas had genuinely set out to achieve. If 
the state had been truly concerned about the constitutional rights of 
the unborn, the Court argued, it would have enacted a far more 
restrictive anti-abortion measure.225 And Texas’s failure to enact such 
a law thus signaled to the Court that it was not being sincere in 
invoking this particularly rigorous and sweeping state interest on 
behalf of the less restrictive law it had chosen to enact. 
Unlike its equality-based counterpart, then, the sincerity-based 
argument can apply even in the absence of an established 
constitutional presumption against discriminatory treatment. But it is 
also true that sincerity-related arguments remain available even 
where a law does discriminate in a constitutionally suspect manner. 
Cleburne, for instance, was an equal protection case, and the Court 
there identified insufficiently restrictive features of the city’s zoning 
decision as evidence of its unconstitutionality.226 But the more 
restrictive means analysis in Cleburne was not intended to highlight a 
nondiscriminatory path forward; rather, its function was to impugn a 
particular claim of interest that the government had proffered to the 
Court: for example, the Court pointed to the city’s permissive 
treatment of fraternity houses and assisted living facilities as 
inconsistent with various goals that Cleburne had cited in support of 
its refusal to permit construction of a living center for mentally 
disabled individuals.227 Had the city instead pursued the more 
restrictive alternative of a categorical ban on the construction of 
 
 223. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 n.54 (1973). 
 224. Id. at 154. 
 225. Id. at 157 n.54 (“But if the fetus is a person who is not to be deprived of life 
without due process of law, and if the mother’s condition is the sole determinant, does not 
the Texas exception appear to be out of line with the Amendment’s command?”). 
 226. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985); see supra 
Section II.C. 
 227. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450. 
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group homes or a hard-and-fast occupancy limit for all dwellings, then 
its arguments about overcrowding, flood risks, and traffic congestion 
might have found greater purchase. But the city’s failure to regulate 
more restrictively led the Court to cast those justifications aside. 
Nor does the supposedly nondiscriminatory nature of a more 
restrictive means preclude it from also highlighting sincerity-based 
defects in a less restrictive law. Consider in this respect Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Lukumi, the animal sacrifice case. 
Tellingly, the bulk of the Court’s more restrictive means analysis 
preceded its application of strict scrutiny; that is, the Court alluded to 
more restrictive alternatives in the course of rendering its threshold 
determination that Hialeah’s animal-sacrifice prohibitions were not in 
fact “generally applicable” with respect to religion.228 That 
determination rested largely on the challenged law’s insufficient 
restrictiveness. By cross-referencing the relatively narrow scope of the 
city’s regulatory approach against the sorts of laws that would have 
more effectively achieved the City’s claimed interest in promoting 
animal safety and public health, the Court was able to look past the 
patina of facial neutrality and find within the regulatory scheme an 
impermissible, religion-targeting object.229 How could, for instance, 
Hialeah claim that its animal sacrifice laws furthered an interest in 
“public health,” when it refused also to prohibit the “improper 
disposal” of animal carcasses by hunters or restaurant managers?230 
How could Hialeah claim that the ordinances furthered an interest in 
“preventing cruelty to animals,” when it continued to permit fishing, 
rodent extermination, euthanasia of stray or unwanted pets, and even 
“the use of live rabbits to train greyhounds”?231 The Court declared in 
so many words that the city both could have and would have pursued 
a more restrictive alternative if it had truly been serious about 
pursuing any of the religion-neutral interests it had invoked. The 
plethora of more restrictive (and generally applicable) alternatives 
available to serve the secular interests associated with the laws 
undermined the conclusion that these particular interests in fact had 
anything to do with the laws’ enactment. 
Thus, in contrast to the equality-based argument, which can 
apply only in connection with a constitutional norm against 
discriminatory treatment, the sincerity-based argument can apply 
both within and outside of doctrines that discourage facial 
 
 228. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 535–36 (1993). 
 229. Id. at 537. 
 230. Id. at 538. 
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discrimination. Similarly, whereas the equality-based argument 
requires as its input a more restrictive means that also qualifies as a 
nondiscriminatory means, the sincerity-based argument can work 
with a more restrictive means that is either discriminatory or 
nondiscriminatory in nature. Indeed, a more restrictive means can 
sometimes function successfully as a “more sincere means” even 
when it manifests precisely the same form of disfavored 
discriminatory treatment as the less restrictive law that it helps to 
condemn.232 In these respects, then, the sincerity-based argument 
enjoys a broader range of operation than does its equality-based 
counterpart. 
IV. THE REGULATORY VIABILITY OF MORE RESTRICTIVE 
ALTERNATIVES 
Both the equality- and sincerity-based arguments provide 
reasons for concluding that the existence of more restrictive means 
cuts against the constitutionality of a less restrictive law. But more 
restrictive means arguments do not always succeed, and there are a 
variety of reasons why this might be so. One important set of reasons 
relates to issues of “regulatory viability.” Simply put, if a posited 
more restrictive alternative is unlikely to achieve the relevant 
government interests as well as the less restrictive law, then that fact 
provides a straightforward reason for dismissing it as an inadequate 
regulatory substitute. This sort of argument frequently arises in cases 
involving more restrictive means analysis, with the government 
pointing to concerns about adverse regulatory consequences as 
justifying, or at least excusing, its failure to regulate more 
restrictively. 
Questions of regulatory viability, to be sure, are by no means 
unique to more restrictive means analysis; they can just as easily arise 
when less restrictive alternatives are being considered as well. But 
these questions take on an added layer of complexity when applied to 
more restrictive alternatives—laws that, by definition, do not require 
the government to “ease up” on any of the parties that it already 
 
 232. In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, for instance, some of the posited more restrictive 
alternatives to the municipal sign ordinance under review might still have qualified as 
content-based; even so, the Court could still leverage such alternatives on behalf of the 
claim that the City was not pursuing its interests as aggressively as possible. 135 S. Ct. 
2218, 2231 (2015) (noting that the City’s ordinance problematically permitted the 
proliferation of “larger ideological signs”); see also id. at 2232 (“The Town has offered no 
reason to believe that directional signs pose a greater threat to safety than do ideological 
or political signs. If anything, a sharply worded ideological sign seems more likely to 
distract a driver than a sign directing the public to a nearby church meeting.”). 
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regulates and thus, on their face, do not require any immediately 
obvious sacrifice in the way of the regulatory interests said to justify a 
law under review. In other words, if the state defends a law’s 
burdensome (or non-beneficial) treatment of a particular individual 
by reference to some regulatory need, that need should presumably 
remain just as well served by a law that leaves that treatment no more 
burdensome (or non-beneficial) than it previously had been. At 
worst, the argument goes, a more restrictive alternative will result in 
the gratuitous coverage of previously uncovered parties—coverage 
that the government may regard as unnecessary but ultimately 
harmless to its regulatory goals. Less restrictive alternatives often 
require some degree of regulatory sacrifice on the part of the state, 
releasing certain parties from a form of adverse treatment the state 
claims is necessary to achieve some important underlying goal. But 
more restrictive alternatives steer clear of that difficulty, leaving 
entirely undiluted the particular set of burdens/benefit-denials the 
state had originally sought to impose. 
That, at least, is the prima facie case for concluding that more 
restrictive alternatives will always serve the relevant government 
interests at least as well as their less restrictive counterparts. But the 
argument faces difficulties, as there exist at least four separate 
reasons why the government might plausibly object to a more 
restrictive alternative on viability-related grounds. First, government 
actors might resist enactment of a more restrictive means for the 
simple reason that it gratuitously regulates unproblematic conduct. 
Second, government actors might complain that a more restrictive 
alternative is unduly costly to administer. Third, government actors 
might argue that a more restrictive alternative affirmatively 
undermines the effective operation of a law’s burden-imposing (or 
benefit-withholding) elements and thus compromises the regulatory 
interest that the government seeks to pursue. And finally, 
government actors might argue that a more restrictive alternative 
undermines additional government interests served by the lenient, or 
non-burden-producing, elements of the law under review. These 
arguments, as will be shown, can make sense on their own terms, but 
some are more effective than others in supplying a doctrinally 
sufficient justification for the government’s failure to regulate more 
restrictively. 
A. Nonexistent Regulatory Benefits 
The first ground on which the government might resist adoption 
of a more restrictive means is the most straightforward: namely, the 
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government might maintain that a given regulatory problem does not 
require anything beyond what a less restrictive law already provides. 
The argument, in short, is one of nonexistent regulatory benefits. 
Where a challenged law covers only the conduct necessary to achieve 
the government’s regulatory ends, expanding the scope of its 
coverage would deliver no additional benefits in connection with 
those ends. The claim, in other words, is not that the increase in 
restrictiveness would jeopardize the government’s ability to achieve 
its interest, but rather that it would force the government to pursue 
that interest in a pointlessly overinclusive manner. 
Recall, for instance, Justice Blackmun’s plurality opinion in 
Burson v. Freeman—the case involving Tennessee’s content-based 
ban on political solicitation within one hundred feet of polling 
places.233 A more restrictive alternative to the law might have 
forbidden all forms of solicitation (commercial, charitable, 
ideological, etc.) within one hundred feet of the polls, thus allowing 
Tennessee to continue pursuing its interest in curbing election fraud 
without so obviously distinguishing between and among different 
types of speech. But to the Burson plurality, this approach seemed 
silly, amounting to a requirement that the state “regulate for 
problems that do not exist.”234 Expanding the coverage of Tennessee’s 
anti-electioneering law, to be sure, would not necessarily have been 
detrimental to the compelling state interests underlying the law: a 
more restrictive alternative might still have deterred political 
solicitation just as forcefully as the less restrictive law under review. 
But the expansion, the plurality maintained, would also have been 
pointless, requiring the state to monitor for and to prohibit various 
forms of solicitation that posed no threat to the holding of fair and 
effective elections.235 Therefore, the plurality held, Tennessee could 
continue to pursue its election-protection interests in the less 
restrictive but discriminatory manner that it currently embraced.236 
How persuasive is this reasoning? The answer depends largely on 
the distinction introduced in the previous Part—i.e., between 
 
 233. See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text. 
 234. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 207 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
 235. See id. 
 236. See id. at 191. The Court credited a similar sort of argument in Rostker, pointing 
to several statements from the legislative record in which military officials claimed no 
need for the power to conscript female soldiers. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 
57, 76 (1981). This emphasis on needlessness, to be sure, did not amount to the whole of 
the argument for upholding the gender-based registration requirements, see infra Section 
IV.B (discussing claims in Rostker about administrative costs), but it did figure 
prominently in the majority opinion. 
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equality-based and sincerity-based invocations of a more restrictive 
alternative. Simply put, an argument about nonexistent regulatory 
benefits can offer a persuasive rebuttal to a sincerity-based challenge, 
but it does not offer much of a response to an equality-based 
challenge. 
The sincerity-based argument, recall, carries force only when a 
more restrictive means would more effectively achieve the interests 
said to justify a less restrictive law. Consequently, if the only effect of 
increasing a law’s restrictiveness would be to bring some amount of 
non-problematic conduct within its regulatory ambit, then the more 
restrictive means does little to cast doubt on the government’s 
commitment to the problem it purports to address. Any attempt in 
Burson, for example, to infer from the Tennessee electioneering ban 
a lack of government seriousness about the fairness of its elections 
would have been severely undercut by a finding that only political 
solicitation posed a threat to electoral fairness. Much to the contrary, 
the finding would have suggested that Tennessee’s decision not to 
enact the more restrictive law reflected nothing more than an 
accurate appraisal of the problem that it faced. And what is true of 
that particular example should be true of sincerity-based arguments 
more generally. From the mere fact that a more restrictive alternative 
would in no way detract from a law’s efficacy, it should not follow that 
the less restrictive law is insufficiently tailored to achieve the interest 
it purports to serve. 
In contrast, where a more restrictive alternative accompanies an 
equality-based attack on a law, the “nonexistent regulatory benefits” 
argument provides a much-weakened defense. As far as the equality-
based argument is concerned, it should not matter much whether an 
increase in restrictiveness fails to translate into an increase in 
regulatory effectiveness. All that matters is that the increase in 
restrictiveness not compromise the government interests in question. 
This is so because the achievement of a constitutionally salient form 
of equality is a benefit in and of itself; that is the critical premise of 
the decision rule that triggered heightened review in the first place. 
Consequently, the needless regulation of nonproblematic conduct 
may simply be a price worth paying to ensure that the government 
does not discriminate on the basis of a constitutionally suspect 
classification. 
Burson again helps to illustrate the point. For reasons already 
discussed, the availability of a more restrictive means in no way 
undermined Tennessee’s claim that the challenged law really did 
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promote electoral fairness.237 But it severely undercut the claim that 
the electoral fairness interest required a departure from the 
constitutional presumption in favor of content-neutral speech 
restrictions.238 A categorical ban on all solicitation at the polls would 
still have allowed the state to achieve its electoral fairness interest and 
to do so in a content-neutral way. True, the more restrictive law might 
not have delivered any additional regulatory benefits in the way of 
regulatory efficacy,239 but it would have delivered the significant 
constitutional benefit of avoiding content-discrimination in the first 
place. If Tennessee’s only objection to the more restrictive alternative 
was that it prohibited non-problematic conduct, then that objection, 
in and of itself, should not have sufficed to save the less restrictive law 
from equality-based constitutional attack. Something more should 
have to be offered by the government to justify the content-
discriminatory lines it had drawn. 
All of that being said, it bears emphasizing that complaints about 
the absence of regulatory benefits do not normally appear in 
isolation. Rather, such complaints typically accompany other claims 
related to the costs of increasing a law’s restrictiveness. From the 
government’s perspective, that is, an unimproved status quo is by no 
means the worst-case result of a restrictiveness-increasing change in 
the law; more problematically, an increase in a law’s restrictiveness 
can impose negative costs on both the government and the parties 
that it regulates. And, as the next Sections will show, these negative 
costs can sometimes provide valid reasons for excusing the 
government’s failure to adopt a more restrictive alternative. 
B. Administrative Costs 
Consider first the prospect of administrative costs. Increasing the 
restrictiveness of legal prohibition often means increasing the costs of 
its implementation.240 Criminalizing a wider range of conduct might 
 
 237. Burson, 504 U.S. at 207. 
 238. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“Content-based 
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 239. I should note that it is by no means inconceivable that a categorical solicitation 
ban would have prevented political solicitation more effectively than the less restrictive 
ban that Tennessee had employed. Perhaps, for instance, a categorical ban would have 
worked better by removing the need to conduct particularized inquiries into the nature of 
arguably “political” forms of solicitation, and by creating a sort of prophylactic deterrent 
against subtler efforts to influence or intimidate voters by means of ostensibly “non-
political” advocacy. 
 240. Though not always. In the context of benefit-conferring laws, the more restrictive 
means will often prove far less costly to administer, thus defeating any governmental 
attempt to wave away the more restrictive means on cost-related grounds. Consider, for 
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require the investigation of more activities, the bringing of more 
prosecutions, and the adjudication of more cases. Ratcheting up 
procedural and evidentiary requirements might slow down the 
government’s processing of administrative claims. Raising everyone’s 
taxes might demand increased monitoring for tax evasion. And 
whenever administrative costs materialize, opportunity costs 
inevitably follow: all else equal, the more resources the government 
must devote to the administration of a more restrictive means, the 
fewer resources it can devote to the regulatory mission on which it 
has fixed its aim. 
The prospect of administrative costs, especially when coupled 
with the prospect of nonexistent regulatory benefits, might therefore 
render a more restrictive means especially undesirable to government 
actors. And the Court has occasionally cited to such concerns as 
providing a legally sufficient basis for excusing a failure to regulate 
more restrictively. Rostker v. Goldberg241 is a telling case in point. All 
parties there agreed that the Selective Service system helped to 
further the government’s important interest in “raising and 
supporting armies.”242 What the parties did not agree on, however, 
was whether that same compelling interest necessitated the 
discriminatory nature of these requirements, or whether the interest 
could be equally well served (if not better served) by a more 
restrictive—and gender-neutral—set of registration requirements. 
The government said no, citing a variety of administrative difficulties 
likely to arise from its implementation of a gender-neutral military 
draft. The Court agreed, excusing the government’s failure to adopt 
the more restrictive alternative in light of concerns about the added 
administrative costs that would result from training conscripted 
female soldiers alongside male soldiers and from developing housing 
policies and “physical standards” for co-educational regiments.243 In 
short, the Court concluded that the various administrative costs of 
 
instance, Justice Scalia’s suggestion in Locke v. Davey that Washington could have 
alternatively achieved its interests by simply abolishing a program that provided 
scholarship money to eligible recipients. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
Certainly, the more restrictive alternative of a non-existent scholarship program would 
have been cheaper than the less restrictive scholarship program that the state actually 
administered. 
 241. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).  
 242. Id. at 70. 
 243. See supra notes 123–31 and accompanying text. Dissenting in Rostker, Justice 
Marshall objected to the majority’s reliance on these and other administrative costs. See 
Rostker, 453 U.S. at 95 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“This Court has repeatedly stated that 
the administrative convenience of employing a gender classification is not an adequate 
constitutional justification under the Craig v. Boren test.”). 
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introducing females into Selective Service were significant enough to 
justify the government’s continued adherence to a less restrictive, 
male-only registration system.244 
One can sympathize with the proposition that the operative 
principles of constitutional doctrine should not force the government 
to devote time, money, and effort toward the regulation of conduct it 
deems unworthy of regulation. But should complaints about 
administrative costs generally suffice to demonstrate the non-viability 
of a more restrictive alternative?  
In my view, they should not. It is, after all, a well-accepted 
feature of any well-functioning constitutional system that rights and 
structural protections will sometimes require government actors to 
work harder at solving a problem than they otherwise would need to 
do: the added degree of work is simply the cost of doing business in a 
system subject to constitutional constraints. An absolute ban on gun 
ownership might provide a more efficient means of gun control than 
any number of different registration, background check, and 
permitting requirements currently in place, but few would cite to that 
fact alone as a reason for upholding such a ban against a Second 
Amendment attack. Uncompensated takings of property might 
simplify the administration of public building projects, but few would 
cite that fact as a valid reason for ignoring the requirements of the 
Takings Clause. Imprisoning citizens without trial might permit the 
courts to function more efficiently, but the Due Process Clause would 
not permit reliance on such an administrative shortcut. And the same 
principle should hold in connection with the various constitutional 
norms that have been considered here: the comparative costliness of a 
more restrictive alternative should not in and of itself render it an 
inadequate substitute for a constitutionally suspect law.245 
 
 244. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 83. So, too, did the Court in Nguyen allude to similar 
concerns, approvingly characterizing the “less demanding” set of citizenship application 
requirements that Congress had enacted as an “easily administered scheme” that steered 
clear of the “subjectivity, intrusiveness, and difficulties of proof” to which a more 
restrictive (but gender-neutral) set of requirements might have given rise. Nguyen v. INS, 
533 U.S. 53, 69 (2001); see also id. at 88 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“There is no reason to 
think that this is a case where administrative convenience concerns are so powerful that 
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 245. See generally Alan Brownstein, Taking Free Exercise Rights Seriously, 57 CASE W. 
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Of no small importance, the Court itself has endorsed this very 
idea, repeatedly asserting that claims of “administrative 
inconvenience” are inadequate to justify the enactment of otherwise 
unconstitutional laws.246 In the sex-discrimination context, for 
instance, the Court has “rejected administrative ease and convenience 
as sufficiently important objectives to justify gender-based 
classifications.”247 Nor may racially discriminatory laws be justified by 
arguments based on “simple administrative convenience” and “the 
interest in avoiding .	.	. bureaucratic effort.”248 Similarly, in the free 
speech context, the Court has rejected claims of “small administrative 
convenience” as insufficient to justify the enactment of content-based 
laws,249 and it has proclaimed more generally that “the First 
Amendment does not permit the State to sacrifice speech for 
efficiency.”250 So too for fundamental rights based claims involving 
equal protection and substantive due process: “the prospect of 
additional administrative inconvenience has not been thought to 
justify invasion of fundamental constitutional rights.”251 To be sure, 
administrative convenience arguments can and should prevail when 
subject to deferential forms of constitutional scrutiny.252 But where 
stricter forms of means/ends analysis apply, the Court has been and 
should be reluctant to uphold a law on convenience-related grounds 
alone. 
The discussion thus far has examined the problem of 
administrative costs as it applies to equality-based based invocations 
of a more restrictive alternative. But the same conclusions should 
generally hold true when sincerity-based arguments enter the picture. 
To see the point, consider once again Justice Harlan’s observation in 
Poe v. Ullman that Connecticut’s failure to enforce its anti-
 
administrative difficulties, must stand guard against an overconcern for mere 
‘convenience’”). 
 246. See Brownstein, supra note 245, at 117–28. 
 247. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976); see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 
U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (plurality opinion) (“[W]hen we enter the realm of ‘strict judicial 
scrutiny,’ there can be no doubt that ‘administrative convenience’ is not a shibboleth, the 
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 248. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 508 (1989); see also Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003) (“[T]hat the implementation of a program capable of 
providing individualized consideration [of college applications] might present 
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system.”). 
 249. Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 102 n.9 (1972). 
 250. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988). 
 251. Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 691 (1977). 
 252. See, e.g., Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 566 U.S. 673, 682 (2012) (quoting 
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contraception statutes “conduce[d] to the inference either that it does 
not consider the policy of the statute a very important one, or that it 
does not regard the means it has chosen for its effectuation as 
appropriate or necessary.”253 And now suppose that Connecticut had 
responded to this argument with a variant on the “administrative 
costs” defense, attributing its non-enforcement of the law to its 
concerns that the requisite investigations, prosecutions, and 
adjudications would drain its treasury of the resources needed to deal 
with other, more important laws on the books. Even if these concerns 
had been 100% real, they would only have served to confirm Justice 
Harlan’s original suspicions. Connecticut, simply put, did not consider 
the goals of its anti-contraceptive statute to be important enough to 
warrant a substantial investment of time, money, and regulatory 
effort—concluding instead that the resources were better spent on 
other regulatory goals. Put somewhat differently, if a state is going to 
claim a “compelling” or “important” interest on behalf of a particular 
law, it should at the least be required to put its money where its 
mouth is. And if the state instead attributes an incomplete pursuit of 
that interest to concerns about administrative costs, the very 
relevance of the “administrative cost” concern should count as a 
reason for rather than against faulting the government for its lack of 
regulatory sincerity. 
C. Diminished Regulatory Efficacy 
Government actors might also resist a more restrictive 
alternative on the ground that it actively undermines the regulatory 
interests that prompted the enactment of the less restrictive law. The 
claim, to be clear, is not simply that the more restrictive means would 
fail to deliver additional regulatory benefits. Nor is it simply that the 
more restrictive means would require an additional investment of 
government resources. Rather, the claim involves the bolder 
proposition that increased restrictiveness would actually undermine 
the effectiveness of the challenged regulatory scheme. Put another 
way, the “difficult regulation” argument holds that expanding the 
scope and/or increasing the stringency of a law’s prohibitions will 
carry the counterintuitive result of reducing its efficacy as a 
regulatory tool.254 
 
 253. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 554 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 254. Notice that a diminished regulatory efficacy argument, if successful, would 
provide grounds for rejecting both equality- and sincerity-based applications of more 
restrictive means analysis. If the government can successfully show that an increase in 
restrictiveness would actively undermine its achievement of an important government 
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At first glance, the diminished regulatory efficacy argument may 
seem to rest on a faulty set of premises. How can it be, one might 
reasonably ask, that increasing the restrictiveness of a law will 
somehow render it less effective at achieving its underlying aims? 
From the government’s perspective, the more restrictive alternative 
should carry the signal virtue of not requiring regulators to relax the 
burdens imposed on any parties whose adverse treatment is required 
by a government interest. If, in other words, the state defends a law’s 
burdensome (or non-beneficial) treatment of a particular individual 
by reference to some regulatory need, that need should presumably 
remain just as well served by a law that treats that particular 
individual exactly the same as before. At worst, the argument goes, a 
more restrictive alternative will result in the gratuitous coverage of 
previously uncovered parties—coverage that the government may 
regard as unnecessary but ultimately harmless to its regulatory goals. 
In the real world, however, regulation is a complicated enterprise 
with lots of moving parts. Contrary to the implications of a simplified 
academic model, more regulation does not necessarily mean more in 
the way of desired regulatory effects. Sometimes, the opposite result 
might obtain, with new (and perhaps unforeseen) regulatory 
interactions throwing sand in the gears of the administrative 
machinery. Increasing restrictiveness could therefore result in a 
regulatory program that turns out to be less effective at achieving its 
aims—not only as applied to the new activities the law has been 
expanded to cover but also as applied the old activities that the law 
had originally targeted. 
Consider in this respect Justice Rehnquist’s plurality opinion in 
Michael M. v. Superior Court. Challengers to California’s gender-
based statutory rape law had raised the possibility of expanding its 
prohibitions to cover both underage males and underage females. 
That modification, at first glance, would have seemed to render the 
law a more effective means of achieving California’s stated interest in 
preventing teenage pregnancies. As Justice Brennan argued in 
dissent, the more restrictive alternative would have covered “twice as 
 
interest, then the more restrictive means will not in fact constitute a viable regulatory 
alternative to the law under review. And if the more restrictive means is not a viable 
regulatory alternative, then it cannot support either of the inferences on which the 
equality- and sincerity-based arguments respectively depend. Even if the more restrictive 
means is nondiscriminatory, it will, on account of its diminished regulatory efficacy, fail to 
demonstrate the possibility of achieving the government’s interest in a nondiscriminatory 
fashion. And where a more restrictive means is in fact a less effective regulatory measure, 
the government’s decision to forgo the measure would seem to affirm, rather than impugn, 
its commitment to the regulatory interests in question. 
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many potential violators,” thus functioning as a “potentially .	.	. 
greater deterrent of sexual activity than a gender-based law.”255 Justice 
Rehnquist, however, reached precisely the opposite conclusion, citing 
to the state’s concerns that the more restrictive alternative would 
“frustrate its interest in effective enforcement” by deterring females 
from coming forward to report violations of the law.256 The total 
number of successful prosecutions, Rehnquist appeared to claim, 
would therefore go down rather than up, with female participants in 
underage sex unwilling to inform prosecutors about conduct for which 
they themselves could be prosecuted. Consequently, even if the law 
on the books might appear to deter more effectively, the law on the 
ground would actually deter less effectively. Or so the plurality 
argued.257 
I am not aware of other cases in which the Justices have explicitly 
embraced arguments of this sort, but variations on the theme are 
readily imaginable. It might have been argued in Lukumi, perhaps, 
that a broadened animal cruelty ordinance—one that included not 
just animal sacrifice rituals but also fishing, hunting, and euthanasia—
would stretch prosecutorial resources so thin as to undermine the 
city’s ability to go after the most heinous and harmful forms of the 
conduct being regulated.258 Or perhaps it could have been argued in 
Burson that prohibiting all forms of solicitation at polling places 
would have made it more difficult for election monitors to deal with 
the targeted problem of undue interference with voters.259 Especially 
when one considers that law enforcement resources are finite, it may 
well be the case that increasing the restrictiveness of law will result in 
weaker enforcement across the board. 
Still, while a more restrictive alternative might sometimes 
introduce new regulatory complications into the mix, the diminished 
regulatory efficacy argument faces two serious difficulties. The first 
difficulty is the previously mentioned “administrative inconvenience” 
rule. If, as the Court has said, constitutionally suspect laws should not 
in fact be sustained on grounds of administrative ease, then 
government actors should not be able to escape the implications of a 
more restrictive means argument by simply claiming that the more 
restrictive law would be more difficult to enforce. Complaints about 
diminished regulatory efficacy, in other words, may turn out to be 
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nothing more than complaints about administrative costs in disguise. 
Indeed, even California’s enforcement-related concerns in Michael M. 
might have been analyzed along these lines. The claim in Michael M. 
was not so much one about the impossibility of convicting guilty 
parties under a gender-neutral statutory rape law, but rather about 
the added administrative burdens of bringing successful prosecutions 
in the absence of fewer voluntary reporters.260 
 At the very least, then, the Court in Michael M. should have 
offered some explanation for its decision to validate California’s 
enforcement-related concerns. Perhaps, for instance, the Court 
regarded the concerns as stating something other than a complaint 
about administrative inconvenience? Perhaps the Court regarded 
Michael M. as a sex discrimination case in which the administrative 
inconvenience bar should not have applied? The Court, however, 
failed to grapple with these questions. 
The broader question raised by the Michael M. case is whether 
diminished regulatory efficacy arguments should always be dismissed 
on the ground that they implicate concerns about administrative 
costs. At some point, the regulatory burdens of enforcing a more 
restrictive alternative may become so prohibitively high as to pose a 
bona fide obstacle to regulatory success—an obstacle that, 
realistically speaking, government actors cannot overcome by simply 
doubling down on their regulatory efforts. In that sense, the 
difference between arguments grounded in diminished regulatory 
efficacy and arguments grounded in administrative costs may be one 
of degree rather than kind. The more severe the regulatory burdens, 
the less plausible it becomes to characterize the complaint as one of 
administrative inconvenience, and the more plausible it becomes to 
say that a more restrictive alternative would actually thwart the 
government’s regulatory objectives. The relevant challenge for the 
court, then, is figuring out where on the severity spectrum this 
distinction should lie. Thus, when the government resists a more 
restrictive alternative on grounds of diminished regulatory efficacy, 
courts should validate the argument only when the government has 
adequately demonstrated the infeasibility or impracticability of 
compensating for the diminished efficacy through added regulatory 
work. Precisely what counts as “infeasible” or “impracticable” will 
not always be an easy question to answer, but it is a question that 
courts have no choice but to confront. 
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But even where a diminished regulatory efficacy argument states 
more than a complaint about administrative costs, a further difficulty 
remains: more restrictive alternatives will often yield effectiveness-
related gains at the same time that they deliver effectiveness-related 
losses. And when a more restrictive alternative simultaneously 
detracts from and contributes to the government’s regulatory goals, 
courts should not view the detractions in isolation from the 
contributions. This point was critical to the dissenters’ disagreement 
with the plurality in Michael M.: even if, as Justice Brennan 
explained, a gender-neutral statutory rape law would have 
undermined the government’s pregnancy-prevention goals by 
discouraging voluntary reporting of prohibited sexual encounters, a 
more restrictive law would have simultaneously furthered the 
government’s interests by doubling the scope of the law’s coverage.261 
The plurality, in other words, had simply identified one respect in 
which a gender-neutral statutory rape law might have failed to deter 
as effectively as its male-only counterpart. But given the possibility 
that a more restrictive alternative might also have generated 
countervailing, deterrence-promoting forces, the plurality’s 
conclusion of diminished regulatory effectiveness in no way followed 
from its premise of “reduced voluntary reporting.” This argument, as 
the dissenters persuasively demonstrated, had a missing link. The 
plurality needed to show that the deterrence-reducing mechanisms of 
the more restrictive means (i.e., the reduced likelihood that females 
would “turn in” violators of law) would outperform their deterrence-
promoting counterparts (e.g., the increased likelihood that both males 
and females would abstain from engaging in underage sexual 
encounters for fear of violating the law).262 The absence of such a 
showing in Michael M. thus significantly undercut the plurality’s 
arguments about diminished regulatory efficacy. 
To summarize, increasing a law’s restrictiveness can sometimes 
carry the counterintuitive consequence of diluting its efficacy. But the 
prospect of diminished regulatory efficacy should not make a legal 
difference unless two further propositions turn out to be true. First, 
the government must be genuinely unable to overcome the newly-
created regulatory obstacles of the more restrictive means. Otherwise, 
a diminished regulatory efficacy claim collapses into an administrative 
costs claim and finds itself subject to the administrative inconvenience 
bar. Second, the government must demonstrate that the effectiveness-
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related losses it has identified are not offset elsewhere by the 
effectiveness-related gains to be had from the increase in a law’s 
restrictiveness. Only when both of these showings have been made 
should a court reject a more restrictive alternative on regulatory-
effectiveness grounds. 
D. Government Interests in Lenience 
Thus far, this Part has considered issues of regulatory viability in 
connection with the government interests advanced by a law’s adverse 
treatment of regulated parties. This is in keeping with the Court’s 
general approach to more restrictive means analysis. In Burson, for 
instance, the Court identified a government interest in suppressing 
political solicitation (i.e., an interest in protecting voters against fraud 
and intimidation), and it then asked whether that interest would be 
equally well served by a law that prohibited all solicitation.263 
Similarly, in Rostker, the Court identified a government interest in 
registering men for the selective service (i.e., an interest in raising and 
supporting an army), and it then asked whether the interest would be 
equally well served by a law requiring both men and women to 
register for the draft.264 In neither case, however, did the Court 
explicitly consider the possibility that the laws’ non-adverse treatment 
of non-regulated parties reflected additional government interests of 
their own. The Court did not ask in Burson, for instance, whether the 
government had an important interest in permitting non-political 
solicitation at the polls, nor did it ask in Rostker whether the 
government had an important interest in exempting females from the 
draft. In both instances, rather, the Court identified the relevant 
government interest by reference to the burden-imposing aspects of 
the laws under review, and it then evaluated the more restrictive 
means by reference to that interest and that interest alone. 
Many laws, however, may simultaneously pursue multiple 
government interests, including interests that relate to their non-
adverse treatment of unregulated (or favorably regulated) conduct. A 
criminal statute may simultaneously further a government interest in 
criminalizing a bad activity and a separate government interest in not 
criminalizing a good activity. The eligibility criteria of a benefits 
program may simultaneously further a government interest in 
withholding benefits from unworthy recipients and a separate 
government interest in furnishing benefits to worthy recipients. 
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Simply put, laws that create both winners and losers need not further 
only those objectives associated with the losses of the losers; they may 
also further additional objectives associated with the wins of the 
winners. 
And where there exist such government interests in lenience, 
there may also exist good reason to question the regulatory viability 
of a more restrictive means. The more restrictive means will often 
serve the interests associated with a law’s burden-imposing (or 
benefit-withholding) elements, because the more restrictive means 
leaves those forms of adverse treatment fully intact. But the same 
cannot be said of the interests associated with a law’s burden-
withholding (or benefit-conferring) elements, some of which will not 
survive an increase in overall restrictiveness. Insofar as the adoption 
of a more restrictive means would compromise a law’s overall 
leniency, it might also threaten to undermine the government 
interests associated with that leniency. 
Recall, for instance, Justice Scalia’s suggestion in Locke v. Davey 
that, instead of withholding scholarships from theological students, 
Washington could have just as well achieved its “anti-establishment” 
interest by abolishing the scholarship program altogether.265 That 
argument makes perfect sense if one stipulates that the only 
government interest implicated by the scholarship program was the 
interest advanced by the law’s adverse treatment of theological 
students. That particular interest, everyone agreed, involved the 
avoidance of an Establishment Clause violation, and that particular 
interest would have remained perfectly well served by a law that 
rendered everyone ineligible for public scholarships, period. But the 
argument becomes far less persuasive when one recognizes that the 
scholarship program’s inclusion of non-theology students served a 
significant government interest of its own—namely, a governmental 
interest in educating its citizens. That interest, unlike the anti-
establishment interest, would have suffered under the more restrictive 
alternative proposed by Justice Scalia, with the state no longer able to 
subsidize what it regarded as worthy educational pursuits. In Davey, 
at least, it was likely the state’s educational interests (and not its anti-
establishment interests) that illustrated the non-viability of the more 
restrictive means that Scalia had proposed. 
The Court more explicitly embraced “lenience-related” interests 
when it recently upheld Florida’s partial ban on judicial campaigning 
in Williams-Yulee—a ban said to further the state’s interest in 
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promoting judicial integrity.266 Viewed exclusively from the 
perspective of this judicial integrity interest, the Florida ban did 
indeed appear to be “fatally underinclusive.”267 Among other things, 
the law still permitted judicial candidates to create campaign 
committees to solicit money on their behalf, and it also allowed such 
candidates to write “thank-you notes” to donors after their 
contributions had been received.268 Surely, the dissenters argued, a 
more restrictive alternative that encompassed these and other 
activities would only have helped to achieve the state’s “judicial 
integrity” interests even more effectively, and surely, they continued, 
the state should be faulted for its failure to close the current law’s 
loopholes.269 But the majority cast these alternatives in a different 
light. The judicial campaigning law, Chief Justice Roberts pointed 
out, implicated not just Florida’s interest in preserving judicial 
integrity but also Florida’s separate interest in “respect[ing] the First 
Amendment interests of candidates” and “resolv[ing] the 
‘fundamental tension between the ideal character of the judicial office 
and the real world electoral politics.’”270 With these additional 
government interests on the table, the regulatory viability of the more 
restrictive means was no longer so obvious. Yes, the more restrictive 
means would have served the judicial integrity interest as effectively 
as (or even more effectively than) the less restrictive law, but it 
simultaneously would have disserved the speech accommodation and 
electoral flexibility interests that the law’s limitations helped to 
advance.271 
Government interests in lenience will therefore sometimes 
provide a strong doctrinal basis for discounting the viability of a more 
restrictive alternative. But the argument can be taken too far. 
Government actors, after all, will always be able to identify some 
interest underlying a decision to “go easy” on a favorably-treated set 
of parties—at the very least, every government choice to limit the 
breadth of a burden-imposing regulation in some manner promotes 
the liberty or property interests of the unregulated group—and not 
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every such interest should automatically excuse the government for 
its failure to regulate more restrictively. 
The Third Circuit’s decision regarding PASPA, the federal 
sports-gambling law, is susceptible to criticism on this ground. 
Dismissing an equal sovereignty challenge to the law’s special 
treatment of Nevada and a few other states, the court rejected the 
challengers’ suggestion that the more restrictive alternative of a truly 
nationwide sports-gambling ban would have just as effectively 
achieved Congress’s interest in discouraging gambling on sports.272 
That argument, the court held, misapprehended the “true purpose” of 
the statute, which was to “stop the spread of state-sanctioned sports 
gambling” beyond the jurisdictions that were exempted from its 
requirement.273 The Third Circuit, in other words, deflected the 
challengers’ “more restrictive means” argument by invoking a 
“lenience interest” latent in the federal sports-gambling act. PASPA 
may have sought to deter sports gambling via its adverse treatment of 
non-exempt states, but it also sought to preserve sports gambling via 
its non-adverse treatment of exempted states, and a categorical 
sports-gambling ban would have frustrated this latter interest. 
What was missing from the Third Circuit’s analysis, however, was 
any explanation as to why this latter “gambling preservation” interest 
should have qualified as important or significant enough to validate 
the claim.274 PAPSA, the Third Circuit seemed to be saying, should be 
upheld because it was “precisely tailored” to serve the government’s 
interest in doing what PAPSA did. That was undoubtedly true. But 
the question remained: was the government’s interest in doing what 
PAPSA did important enough to justify a departure from the equal 
sovereignty principle?275 
 
 272. Indeed, as Thomas Colby has pointed out, if Congress’s true goal with PASPA to 
discourage sports gambling, the statute’s coverage scheme got things precisely backwards, 
by permitting sports gambling in areas where the practice thrived the most. See Colby, 
supra note 188, at 1156–57. 
 273. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 239 (3d Cir. 
2013). 
 274. Defenders of the law had argued, for instance, that the “grandfathering” interests 
helped to safeguard the reliance interests of states that already depended on revenue 
streams from sports gambling and thus stood to lose much more than their fellow states 
from an across-the-board prohibition on the practice. See, e.g., Response Brief of 
Plaintiffs-Appellees at 16–17, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., Nos. 13-
1713, 13-1714, 13-1715 (3d Cir. June 7, 2013) (discussing Congress’s recognition of some 
states’ “reliance interests” on sports gambling revenues). 
 275. One can understand along similar lines the then-Justice Rehnquist’s argument in 
Michael M. that California’s less restrictive statutory rape measure helped to “equalize the 
deterrents on the sexes” in a way that a more restrictive, gender-neutral measure would 
not. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 473 (1981) (plurality opinion). Recast as 
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In sum, government interests in lenience may sometimes provide 
good reason to characterize a more restrictive alternative as an 
inadequate regulatory substitute for a less restrictive law. The logic of 
the argument is simple and sound: sometimes the government pursues 
goals related to the non-adverse treatment of various legal entities, 
and a more restrictive means would frustrate those goals insofar as it 
would require the government to treat those entities less favorably. 
But the argument should succeed only where the lenience-related 
interests are themselves shown to be sufficiently strong, satisfying 
whatever criterion of significance (i.e., “legitimate,” “important,” 
“compelling”) the applicable level of scrutiny sets forth. Absent such 
a requirement, lenience-related interests would provide a too-easy 
excuse for the government’s failure to adopt a more restrictive means, 
permitting the government to justify a constitutionally suspect law by 
reference to little more than its own desire to adopt the 
constitutionally suspect law. There is a reason why means/ends 
analysis probes not just the degree of means/ends fit but also the 
importance of the ends themselves. And that should remain the case 
when lenience-related interests enter the picture. 
This Part has explored a variety of different avenues by which 
the government might contest the proposition that a more restrictive 
means constitutes an adequate regulatory substitute to a less 
restrictive law. Some are more promising than others. Arguments 
about nonexistent regulatory benefits can offer a persuasive response 
to sincerity-based, but not equality-based, invocations of a more 
restrictive means. Arguments about administrative costs should rarely 
succeed, at least insofar as the Court continues to insist that 
heightened means/ends scrutiny does not permit justifications based 
on convenience and administrative ease. Arguments about 
diminished regulatory efficacy carry more promise, but only insofar as 
(a) they assert something more than a complaint about administrative 
costs, and (b) they account for compensating regulatory benefits that 
 
an argument about lenience-related interests, the claim goes as follows: California’s 
statutory rape law actually pursued two government interests simultaneously: (1) the 
interest in deterring teenage pregnancies, which was furthered by the imposition of 
penalties on underage male,; and (2) a “lenience-related” interest in accommodating the 
“physical” sanction of an unwanted pregnancies, which was furthered by the withholding 
of penalties from underage females. Id. The more restrictive alternative of a gender-
neutral prohibition might not have undermined the first interest, but—the plurality 
seemed to suggest—it would certainly have undermined this second interest, by “over-
penalizing” the female-participant in sexual conduct. Id. On that basis, Rehnquist’s 
opinion concluded that the more restrictive alternative turned out to be an inadequate 
regulatory substitute for the less restrictive law that California had enacted. Id. at 473–74. 
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might also result from the adoption of a more restrictive alternative. 
Finally, arguments about lenience-related interests should often 
succeed, provided that the lenience-related interests qualify as 
sufficiently important regulatory objectives. 
But even where all of these regulatory viability arguments fail, 
there remains one last arrow in the government’s quiver. When 
challengers wield a more restrictive means for purposes of attacking 
on a less restrictive law, the government might redirect the 
constitutional attack towards the more restrictive means itself. In 
other words, governments might sometimes defend a less restrictive 
law by suggesting that the more restrictive alternative would itself be 
unconstitutional. The next Part considers the promises and pitfalls of 
such an approach. 
V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL VIABILITY OF MORE RESTRICTIVE 
ALTERNATIVES 
A final potential justification for the government’s failure to 
regulate more restrictively circles back to the Constitution itself. 
Simply put, the government might claim that a more restrictive 
alternative, even if an adequate regulatory substitute, would find itself 
subject to constitutional invalidation. Surely, the argument goes, the 
Court should not fault the government for a failure to adopt a more 
restrictive means that would itself turn out to violate the Constitution 
as well. 
This argument is intuitively forceful, but it should not always be 
decisive. Its persuasiveness, rather, depends once again on the 
distinction between equality-based and sincerity-based invocations of 
a more restrictive means. Let us consider each argument in turn. 
A. The Equality-Based Argument 
The equality-based argument invokes more restrictive 
alternatives for the purpose of suggesting that a regulatory interest 
does not require the government to discriminate in a constitutionally 
suspect manner. That is, the availability of the more restrictive 
alternative serves to undercut the government’s argument that it must 
unavoidably discriminate in order to meet a pressing regulatory need. 
In order for this type of claim to succeed, the more restrictive 
means must itself pass constitutional muster. Otherwise, the argument 
will collapse. “We would like to pursue this interest in a non-
discriminatory fashion,” the government would respond, “but given 
the obvious unconstitutionality of the more restrictive option, we 
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have concluded that this discriminatory law was the least 
constitutionally objectionable option at our disposal.” Where the 
relevant interests are sufficiently strong, and where the posited more 
restrictive alternatives would themselves violate the Constitution, the 
government thus retains a strong justification for its decision to 
discriminate. The government can argue, in effect, that the 
discriminatory law represents the “least constitutionally bad” of the 
regulatory options at its disposal. 
The more interesting puzzle here lies in asking how a more 
discriminatory, but less restrictive law could ever pose fewer 
constitutional problems than a nondiscriminatory, but more 
restrictive counterpart. If, after all, an area of doctrine has tagged 
nondiscriminatory laws as constitutionally preferable to 
discriminatory laws, why should the court ever regard a 
discriminatory law as constitutionally preferable to a 
nondiscriminatory alternative? A moment’s thought provides the 
answer: In many cases, the increased restrictiveness of the more 
restrictive (but nondiscriminatory) law will itself give rise to new 
constitutional defects that the less restrictive (but discriminatory) law 
manages to avoid. That a given area of doctrine generally favors 
discriminatory over nondiscriminatory laws does not make every 
discriminatory law constitutionally preferable to every 
nondiscriminatory law. And that is especially so where the former 
proves to be more restrictive than the latter. 
To see the point, consider again Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project. There the Court upheld a federal criminal prohibition on 
providing material support to foreign terrorist organizations, even 
while acknowledging the content-discriminatory nature of the 
prohibition before it.276 I earlier noted that the Court failed even to 
consider whether there existed any more restrictive (but 
nondiscriminatory) alternatives to the federal material support 
statute. Nowhere, in particular, did Chief Justice Roberts ask whether 
the government might alternatively have pursued its terrorism-
prevention interests via a content-neutral (i.e., nondiscriminatory) 
prohibition on any and all communications with a designated terrorist 
organization.277 Such an alternative, after all, would have militated 
strongly against the conclusion that content discrimination was in fact 
necessary to achieve a compelling government interest. The material-
support statute was content-based, the more restrictive means would 
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have been content-neutral, and the latter would have presumably 
been no worse than the former at deterring terrorism-aiding conduct. 
How, then, could the Court justify its decision to permit the 
government to combat terrorism in a content-based manner when 
there existed an obviously content-neutral means of doing the same? 
We cannot know for sure why the Court in Humanitarian Law 
Project declined to go down this road, because the Court did not 
address the issue. But I suspect that the majority would have 
answered the question as follows: the more restrictive alternative, 
even if content-neutral, would have been irredeemably 
unconstitutional. And the fallacy in concluding otherwise lies in the 
failure to notice that content-neutral statutes are not themselves 
automatically valid under the First Amendment. In fact, content-
neutral statutes must still withstand intermediate scrutiny, one 
component of which requires that the “incidental restriction on .	.	. 
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the 
furtherance of [the government] interest.”278 The more restrictive 
alternative would have fared especially poorly on that score, bringing 
within its reach a wide range of communications with especially 
dubious connections to the government’s terrorism-prevention 
interests. Put somewhat differently, the more restrictive alternative 
might have eliminated (or mitigated) the constitutional defect of 
content discrimination, but only at the expense of introducing (or 
exacerbating) the constitutional defect of a dramatically overinclusive 
coverage scheme. Given that fact, the government should not have 
been faulted for failing to enact a law that would have generated 
serious First Amendment problems of its own.279 
The more general point is this: from the different levels of 
scrutiny accorded to discriminatory and nondiscriminatory laws, it 
does not automatically follow that nondiscriminatory laws are always 
less unconstitutional than their discriminatory counterparts. 
Differential levels of scrutiny reveal that discriminatory treatment is a 
variable that weighs against a finding of constitutional validity, but 
they do not reveal that the presence of discriminatory treatment 
qualifies as the exclusive such variable. It is not enough to say that a 
 
 278. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968). 
 279. To be clear, the point is not that the Court decided Holder correctly: Even putting 
to one side the issue of more restrictive alternatives, there exist other grounds for 
criticizing the decision. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 2, at 3139 (noting that the Court in 
Holder “arguably applied a less stringent means-ends test” in upholding the material 
support law, as evidenced, for instance, by the Court’s failure to “explain how the 
‘contribution’ of training in international law could be ‘fungible’ with support for terrorist 
activities, in the way other forms of contribution (such as money) could be”). 
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more restrictive alternative would pass constitutional muster simply 
because it is nondiscriminatory. That the more restrictive alternative 
is nondiscriminatory explains only that it would trigger a less 
demanding form of scrutiny were it ever to face a constitutional 
challenge. One must therefore go on to ask how the more restrictive 
alternative would fare under that level of scrutiny before concluding 
that the more restrictive alternative would also be a constitutionally 
valid one. And precisely because such an alternative would yield an 
increase in the law’s restrictiveness, there will often be good reason to 
conclude that this is not the case.280 
B. The Sincerity-Based Argument  
In contrast to equality-based arguments, sincerity-based 
arguments can sometimes derive support from more restrictive 
alternatives of dubious constitutional validity. This point should be 
evident from some of the cases already considered. For example, the 
thrust of the Court’s analysis in Roe left strong signals that the Court 
would have struck down (and still would strike down) a law that 
prohibited abortions deemed necessary to safeguard the life of the 
mother281 Nevertheless, the Court still pointed to Texas’s refusal to 
adopt such a law as a reason to invalidate the relatively less restrictive 
abortion ban under review. Not all of the Court’s cases, to be sure, 
have alluded to more restrictive alternatives with so little a chance of 
being upheld, but these and other examples at least raise the question 
of how a constitutionally invalid more restrictive means might 
nonetheless manage to carry persuasive force. How could the 
government’s refusal to enact a possibly (or even obviously) 
unconstitutional law end up jeopardizing the fate of the less 
restrictive law that it did in fact choose to enact? 
 
 280. Arguments related to the unconstitutionality of more restrictive alternatives will 
sometimes blend into “lenience-related” arguments of the sort we considered in the 
previous Section. See supra Section IV.D. Rather than defend its failure to regulate more 
restrictively by citing the independent unconstitutionality of a more restrictive alternative, 
the government might defend the less restrictive law as advancing a supplemental interest 
in avoiding the imposition of constitutional harms on non-regulated parties. That is to say, 
the constitutional defects of a more restrictive alternative might highlight not just the legal 
impossibility of pursuing a government interest in a nondiscriminatory fashion but also a 
valid and sufficiently strong lenience interest in sparing regulated parties from excess 
constitutional harm. Cf. Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1669 (2015) 
(suggesting that by avoiding the more restrictive alternative of a content-neutral ban on 
judicial fundraising, a Florida law helped to advance the government interest in 
“respect[ing] the First Amendment interests of candidates”). 
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An answer to this question becomes apparent if the sincerity-
based argument is understood to operate as a backward-looking claim 
about legislative motive. Understood in this way, the role of the more 
restrictive means is not so much to highlight alternative means of 
future regulation as it is to raise doubts about the reasons for which 
the government regulated in the past. And where the more restrictive 
means functions in this way, its own present-day unconstitutionality 
need not undermine its own doctrinal force. Consider again the 
example of Roe: even if an exception-less abortion prohibition would 
have faltered under the logic of Roe itself, its hypothetical availability 
to the Texas legislature still reveals something about the factual and 
normative premises that Texas legislators embraced when they 
enacted the less restrictive measure that the Court struck down. In 
short, a more restrictive means that is obviously unconstitutional 
today can still shed light on the reasons for which the government 
acted yesterday. And those reasons, in turn, can provide a basis for 
invalidating the less restrictive law under review. 
That is not to say that the constitutional validity (or lack thereof) 
of a more restrictive alternative is necessarily irrelevant to a 
backwards-looking determination about improper government 
motives. The greater the constitutional defectiveness of a more 
restrictive alternative, the easier it becomes for the government to 
attribute its past non-enactment to something other than a lack of 
regulatory seriousness. “Yes,” government actors might say, “we 
know that the particular regulatory alternative you have identified 
would have served our interests much more effectively, but we also 
knew that it would never have stood a chance of being upheld in 
court. So, rather than underscoring our lack of commitment to a 
particular regulatory objective, the more restrictive means simply 
reflects our reluctant bow to the realities of operative constitutional 
doctrine.” Constitutional invalidity, that is, might offer a valid excuse 
for the government’s failure to adopt even the most effective of 
regulatory measures, thus defeating any inference that the 
government sought to pursue some other set of illegitimate interests 
when it put the less restrictive law into effect. 
Consider in this respect the Court’s opinion in Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants Association,282 which, in striking down 
California’s prohibition on violent video games, characterized the 
law’s “wildly underinclusive” nature as a critical constitutional 
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defect.283 California had invoked an interest in promoting the 
wellbeing of children, citing concerns that the early exposure to video 
games would lead to the development of violent behavioral 
tendencies in many of its citizens.284 But, as the majority observed, 
children in California remained exposed to other depictions of 
violence that were equally likely to cause that same harm.285 From 
there the Court went on to explain: 
Of course, California has (wisely) declined to restrict Saturday 
morning cartoons, the sale of games rated for young children, 
or the distribution of pictures of guns. The consequence is that 
its regulation is wildly underinclusive when judged against its 
asserted justification, which in our view is alone enough to 
defeat it. Underinclusiveness raises serious doubts about 
whether the government is in fact pursuing the interest it 
invokes, rather than disfavoring a particular speaker or 
viewpoint. Here, California has singled out the purveyors of 
video games for disfavored treatment—at least when compared 
to booksellers, cartoonists, and movie producers—and has 
given no persuasive reason why.286 
The Court in Brown thus pointed to California’s failure to adopt 
a more restrictive means as indicative of government insincerity, 
while simultaneously characterizing as wise that same failure to 
regulate more restrictively. But the narrowness of California’s anti-
violence measure was wise precisely because the more restrictive 
means envisioned by the Court would itself almost certainly have 
been struck down. So, rather than reveal a nefarious government 
attempt to suppress a disfavored set of viewpoints, the underinclusive 
scope of the California law might simply have reflected a 
straightforward legal judgment by the state about what sorts of 
materials the First Amendment did not (yet) prohibit it from 
regulating. In accusing California lawmakers of regulatory insincerity, 
the Court in Brown never considered the possibility that California’s 
decision not to restrict minors’ access to more traditional media 
stemmed from a bona fide attempt to comport with then-existent 
First Amendment principles. 
So how can we tell whether an obviously more restrictive 
alternative is capable of supporting a backwards-looking inference 
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U.S. 524, 540 (1989)). 
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about government motives? The relevant distinction must be one of 
timing. The Court’s more restrictive means analysis in Brown was 
questionable because the pre-Brown case law already cast doubt on 
the constitutionality of prohibiting minors from purchasing movies, 
books, and photographs. And the availability of such a benign 
explanation for the law’s underinclusiveness thus undercut the 
Court’s accusations of government insincerity. The same point might 
not be true, however, when the constitutional defects of a more 
restrictive means stem from doctrinal developments that postdate the 
government’s decision to regulate less restrictively. In Roe, for 
instance, Texas would have had more trouble attributing the non-
categorical nature of its abortion to ban to a desire to stay within 
then-existing constitutional limits. Texas’s ban had gone into effect 
well before the Court had restricted a state’s ability to prohibit any 
abortions, much less medically necessary abortions.287 The more 
restrictive means, in other words, might have been obviously 
unconstitutional according to Roe itself, but it would not have been 
obviously (or even remotely) unconstitutional according to the norms 
that prevailed when the state registered its decision not to prohibit 
abortions categorically. Thus, whereas California in Brown might 
plausibly have attributed the relative lenience of its law to an external 
legal constraint over which it had no control, Texas in Roe could not 
have done the same. 
CONCLUSION 
Where does all this leave us? My thesis, in short, has been that 
“more restrictive means” analysis constitutes a real and analytically 
valid method of constitutional decision-making, which derives 
naturally from the Court’s longstanding emphasis on formal equality 
and government sincerity as values of constitutional importance. It 
remains to be asked whether these values should, in fact, matter as 
much as they do, and that is not a question that this Article purports 
to answer. But I hope to have demonstrated that, if constitutional 
doctrine embraces these values, the doctrine must also embrace at 
least some forms of more restrictive means analysis as well. One can 
question the wisdom of treating a law’s relative lenience as a 
constitutional liability, just as one can defend the centrality of 
equality- and/or sincerity-related values within a range of different 
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doctrines. But one cannot easily do both of these things at the same 
time. 
I also hope to have shown that embracing more restrictive means 
analysis does not mean resigning oneself to a regime of ever-
escalating restrictiveness. The equality-based and sincerity-based 
arguments should not always succeed, as governments have at their 
disposal several different means of contesting the claim that they 
could have or should have pursued their interests in a more restrictive 
fashion. Some of these defenses, to be sure, can implicate difficult 
judgment calls. It will not always be easy to determine, for instance, 
whether a failure to produce additional regulatory benefits should 
count against a more restrictive law,288 whether a particular lenience-
related interest qualifies as important enough to justify a refusal to 
regulate more restrictively,289 whether a set of enforcement-related 
concerns amounts to more than just a complaint about administrative 
convenience,290 whether a posited more restrictive alternative would 
itself run afoul of the Constitution (and, if so, the extent to which that 
fact should matter),291 and so forth. These and other questions will 
often prove difficult to answer, and no amount of abstract theorizing 
can likely change that fact. Even so, I do believe that by confronting 
these sorts of questions directly and on their own terms, courts can 
more clearly and cogently identify those circumstances in which more 
restrictive alternatives should make a constitutional difference. 
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